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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Background 
The principle of conferral stipulates that the European Union (EU) must act within the limits 
of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty. Until the entry into force of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in December 2009, sport was not mentioned 
in the Treaties. This meant that the EU was not granted a competence to operate a ‘direct’ 
sports policy. This gave rise to two broad concerns. First, that EU sports policy to date has 
been guided by the judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and that single 
market laws, such as those concerning freedom of movement and competition, have not 
sufficiently recognised the specificity of sport. A second concern is that EU sports policy has 
lacked status and coherence. Sport has become associated not only with free movement 
and competition laws but also with a large number of other EU policy areas including, public 
health, education, training, youth, equal opportunities, employment, environment, media 
and culture. However, the ability of the EU to allocate financial resources to this activity 
and to develop a coherent policy on sport has met with constitutional difficulties given the 
absence of an express Treaty competence for sport. The competence question has meant 
that the EU has struggled to give sport high status and comprehensive treatment. This is a 
concern given that the EU is increasingly being asked by sports stakeholders to provide a 
coherent response to contemporary challenges in sport. 
 
Aims 
The aim of the present study is to provide the European Parliament's Committee on Culture 
and Education with a panorama of the possibilities of EU sports policy at a time when these 
are being reviewed after the approval of the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, the study 
assesses from a legal point of view, the potential of the new TFEU to enable the EU to 
attain the objectives of greater fairness and openness in sporting competitions and greater 
protection of the moral and physical integrity of sports practitioners whilst taking account of 
the specific nature of sport. Structured around 6 chapters, this study explores the 
significance of Article 165 on current and pending issues in EU sports law and policy. 
Chapter 1 explores the meaning and origins of key phrases contained in Article 165 
including ‘European sporting issues’, the ‘specific nature of sport’ and the ‘European 
dimension of sport’. Chapter 2 explains the constitutional limits to EU action in the field of 
sport. Chapter 3 explores how the general meanings discussed in chapter 1 find legal 
expression within the context of the application of EU free movement and competition laws. 
Chapter 4 explains the significance of Article 165 in relation to the EU’s ability to carry out 
actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States in the field 
of sport. Chapter 5 presents the findings of the study’s consultation exercise which was 
designed to establish interested stakeholders’ preferences and priorities for the 
implementation of Article 165 TFEU. Finally, chapter 6 presents conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
The New Article 165 Competence 
Article 165(1) TFEU provides that ‘The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European 
sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on 
voluntary activity and its social and educational function’. Article 165(2) continues that 
‘Union action shall be aimed at: developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting 
fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible 
for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and 
sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen’. Article 165(3) states 
that ‘The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the 
competent international organisations in the field of education and sport, in particular the 
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
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Council of Europe’. Finally, Article 165(4) permits the EU institutions to adopt incentive 
measures and recommendations, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations 
of the Member States’. This new competence has raised expectations that the Treaty Article 
can provide solutions to the two concerns detailed in ‘background’ above. In this respect, 
this study draws two main conclusions:  
 
 
1. Application of eu free movement and competition laws 
 
First, Article 165 will have a limited impact on the EU’s legal powers over sport, particularly 
in relation to the application of internal market laws. This is because Article 165 does not 
contain a horizontal clause requiring sporting issues, and questions of fairness and 
openness in sporting competitions, to be taken into account in the exercise of other 
powers, such as free movement and competition law. This is to be contrasted with other 
Treaty competencies, such as the provisions on environmental protection and public health, 
which do contain horizontal clauses. Therefore, from a strict constitutional perspective 
Article 165 should not alter the existing sports related jurisprudence of the ECJ and the 
decision making practice of the Commission. This is not to say that sport cannot, will not, 
or ought not be considered when taking action in other fields. For example, in the sporting 
case of Bernard, the Court confirmed that the Article 165 TFEU reference to the specific 
nature of sport strengthened arguments that they should be taken into account when 
examining the legality of restrictions to freedom of movement.1 However, Article 165 TFEU 
seems to stop short of imposing a constitutional requirement to do so in either legislative or 
administrative action. At least in the Bernard judgment, reference to the specific nature of 
sport merely reinforces judicial possibilities which were already open prior to the passage of 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
The absence of horizontality is, in the opinion of the research team, not detrimental to the 
interests of sports bodies who may have been hoping that Article 165 offers greater 
protection from the reach of EU law than previously existed. This is because the 
opportunities to give sports bodies a wide margin of appreciation are substantial even if 
Article 165 TFEU stops short of imposing a constitutional requirement to do so. For 
example, in the Walrave judgment, the ECJ made a distinction between ‘purely sporting 
rules’ that had nothing to do with economic activity, and those that had impacts on 
economic activity.2 The judgment also suggested that nationality discrimination, otherwise 
clearly prohibited by the Treaties, was not relevant to ‘the composition of sports teams, in 
particular national teams’.3 Although the extent of the exemptions given to sports in both of 
these interpretations have since been curtailed by modern case law, three modern methods 
go beyond the limited exemption in Walrave and enable sporting practices to receive 
sensitive treatment even in the absence of legislative special treatment.  
 
First, rules that are ‘inherent’ to the proper conduct of sport may in some circumstances 
not fall within the Treaty. Secondly, rules that do fall within the Treaty because they are 
restrictions of freedom of movement may be justified, by reference to both grounds found 
in the Treaty itself and to objective justifications developed before the ECJ. Competition law 
and free movement both also entail grounds of justification found in the Treaties. The third, 
and more unconventional method, is for the legal framework to be applied to sport in a 
sensitive way in those cases where it contains few sport-specific exceptions. A review of the 
existing case law undertaken by the research team confirms that the Court and the 
                                                 
1  Case C-325/08, Olympic Lyonnais v Bernard & Newcastle United, paragraph 40. 
2  Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale ECR [1974] 1405, paragraph 4.  
3  Walrave paragraph 8. 
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Commission have already been highly receptive to the notion that sport contains a ‘specific 
nature’. Indeed, it is worth re-iterating that the ECJ’s treatment of Article 165 TFEU in the 
Bernard case supports the view that whilst the new sports competence may have given 
further weight to sports-related arguments, it has not opened any new previously 
undiscovered avenues of appeal. This is because the judicial avenues for recognising the 
specific nature of sport are already well developed by the Court and the Commission.   
 
 
2. The status and coherence of eu sports policy 
 
On the second area of concern - that EU sports policy has thus far lacked status and 
coherence - Article 165 TFEU will make a much more definitive contribution. Article 165 
allows for the development of a direct supportive and complementary policy in the field of 
sport. Previously, in order to escape accusations of acting beyond its powers, the EU linked 
its sports-related funding programmes to existing competencies in the Treaty, such as 
education policy. The new sports competence contained in Article 165 allows the EU to 
finance sport directly without the need to justify this action with reference to other Treaty 
competencies. Thus, the entry into force of the TFEU opens a range of possibilities to EU 
institutions including, amongst others, funding programmes on social inclusion, health 
promotion, education and training, volunteering, anti-doping, the protection of minors, 
combating violence and corruption in sport, the promotion of good governance in sport and 
supporting the development of a well researched evidence base on current issues in sport.  
 
In the consultation exercise undertaken to inform this study, the respondents identified 
three priority areas for EU action in the field of sport: (1) sport health and education, (2) 
the recognition and encouragement of volunteering in sport, and (3) the development of 
sport activities as a tool for social inclusion. The three priorities feature prominently in 
almost all of the responses and they are also clearly aligned with the priority areas 
identified by the Commission in the White Paper on Sport,4 the 2009 and 2010 preparatory 
actions5 and the public consultation exercise.6 Similar areas, albeit with different headings, 
were discussed in the European Sport Forum 2010 organised in Madrid and were positively 
received by the representatives of the sport organisations.7  
 
In the White Paper on Sport the Commission recognised that the commercialisation of sport 
has attracted new stakeholders and this ‘is posing new questions as regards governance, 
democracy and representation of interest within the sport movement’.8 The Commission 
suggested that it can play a role in helping to develop a common set of principles for good 
governance in sport such as transparency, democracy, accountability and representation of 
stakeholders. In the White Paper, the Commission argued that governance issues in sport 
should fall within a territory of autonomy and that most challenges can be addressed 
through self-regulation which must however be ‘respectful of good governance principles’.9 
In this respect, the reference in Article 165(2) to the promotion of cooperation between 
bodies responsible for sports adds impetus to the Commission’s agenda. In particular, the 
Commission has long promoted dialogue with the sports movement and has been at the 
                                                 
4  European Commission (2007), White Paper on Sport, COM(2007), 391 final, p. 3-7. 
5  European Commission (2009), 2009 annual work programme on grants and contracts for the preparatory 
action in the field of sport and for the special annual events, COM (2009) 1685, 16 March 2009. 
6  European Commission (2010), Strategic choices for the implementation of a new EU competence in the field of 
sport, EU-wide consultation report, available online at  
 http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/doc/a/100726_online_consultation_report.pdf. 
7  See the Forum’s report published by the European Commission, available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/doc/b1/sport_forum_madrid_report_11_05_10.pdf. 
8  White Paper, section 4. 
9  Ibid section 4. 
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forefront of encouraging social dialogue. Article 165 also adds impetus to efforts to move 
dialogue between the EU and the sports movement onto a more structured footing. 
However, given the diversity of the sports movement, structuring dialogue on a meaningful 
and inclusive basis is a significant challenge for the EU.  
 
A way forward for the Commission in this respect is to use Article 165(2) to develop 
thematic dialogue with the sports movement over specific issues such as the regulation of 
agents and the protection of minors. The structure of this dialogue should not assume that 
any single stakeholder has a monopoly on representation and therefore bilateral dialogue 
between the Commission and individual stakeholders should be discouraged. Thematic 
structured dialogue should not lead to ‘agreements’ such as the so-called Bangermann 
agreement on player quotas in 1991. In this instance, the ECJ reminded the Commission 
that it does not possess the power to authorise practices that are contrary to the Treaty.10 
It is also important that structured dialogue, either conducted through the European Sports 
Forum, bilaterally or thematically, in no way undermines efforts by social partners to 
conclude agreements within the context of social dialogue committees in sport.  
 
The other innovation brought by Article 165 concerns the possibilities surrounding member 
state political cooperation. Until the entry into force of Article 165 TFEU, member state 
political cooperation took place informally outside the formal Council structure. Individual 
Presidencies often decided to prioritise sport but discussion was restricted to informal 
meetings of EU Sport Ministers and EU Sport directors and to ad hoc expert meetings on 
priority themes. Article 165 grants the Member States a competence to adopt a more 
formal and coherent approach to sport and in May 2010, ministers discussed EU sport 
policy for the first time in a formal Council setting.  
 
Conclusions And Recommendations 
Article 165 does not contain a horizontal clause. There are no provisions in the Article that 
require sporting issues to be taken into account when making policies in other areas, but 
there are also no provisions in 165 which prohibit the EU from doing so. Regardless of the 
value attached to Article 165 by the Court and the Commission, its existence is unlikely to 
alter their existing approach to sport. A review of existing EU sports law cases reveals that 
Article 165 TFEU will add little further protection for contested sports rules beyond that 
already provided by the Court and the Commission. In this regard, the review reveals that 
the Court and the Commission have already been highly receptive to the notion that sport 
contains a ‘specific nature’. Therefore, the often requested production of guidelines on the 
application of free movement and competition law to the sports sector may not greatly 
assist the search for legal certainty. The Commission’s White Paper on Sport more than 
adequately explains the legal framework applicable to sport. Furthermore, as the ECJ 
decided in Meca-Medina, contextual analysis and the requirements of proportionality control 
in EU law necessitate a case-by-case analysis of disputes involving sport. This renders any 
informal guidelines subject to challenge.11 
 
Rather than passively relying on the reference to the ‘specific nature of sport’ contained in 
Article 165 to seek to repel the influence of EU law in sport, the sports movement should 
take a lead in defining this contested term. This definition should be built into the relevant 
sports regulations following an open and transparent method of operation facilitated by the 
governing bodies but involving affected stakeholders. The definition should be thoroughly 
                                                 
10  Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others, [1995] 
ECR I-4921, paragraph 136.  
11  Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991. 
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reasoned and backed with robust data. The EU has a strong role to play in facilitating this 
dialogue, sharing best practice and ensuring that sporting autonomy is conditioned on the 
implementation of good governance in sport. Efforts at encouraging social dialogue in sport 
should be maintained and moves towards a structured dialogue should not undermine 
these efforts. Thematic dialogue with the sports movement should be encouraged. 
 
Article 165 resolves any legal uncertainty concerning the competence of the EU to directly 
fund sports related programmes. It is now clear that the EU has the competence to directly 
carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the member states in 
the field of sport and this competence grants the EU a potentially wide field of action. 
However, the choice of priority themes should be directly linked to the themes contained in 
Article 165 and before supporting priority areas, the EU should demonstrate the European 
dimension in sport and establish the added value of EU action. A focus on a narrow range 
of priority areas is to be favoured over a broad approach so that the added value of EU 
action can be demonstrated. In this connection, the consultation exercise reveals that 
stakeholders favour action in the areas of health enhancing physical education, 
volunteering and social inclusion. In addition to these areas, there is a need to focus on 
evidence based policy making and in this connection the EU should fund research and 
encourage stakeholders to justify their positions with solid data and research.  
 
On the face of it, Article 165(4) also appears to be unequivocal concerning the prohibition 
on harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the member states. This statement might 
encourage claims that the laws and regulations of the member states cannot be 
harmonised in so far as this would affect sporting practices. However, an examination of 
past prohibitions of harmonisation and their treatment by the ECJ suggests that 
harmonising measures can be taken despite this type of prohibition so long as the 
harmonising measures are nominally based on another Treaty competence. Despite 
similarly worded prohibitions of harmonisation in the fields of social policy, education, 
vocational training, culture, and public health, the EU has in practice achieved convergence 
in legislation through other legal bases.  
Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies 
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INTRODUCTION 
The principle of conferral stipulates that the EU must act within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon it by the Treaty. Until the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) in December 2009, sport was not mentioned in the Treaties. 
This meant that the EU was not granted a competence to operate a ‘direct’ sports policy. 
This gave rise to two broad concerns:   
 
First, there is a concern that EU sports policy to date has been guided by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and that single market laws have not sufficiently recognised the 
specificity of sport. EU single market competences, particularly those relating to free 
movement and competition law, exert an indirect influence over sport. Following the 
judgment of the ECJ in Bosman, many sports bodies argued that the lack of a Treaty 
competence for sport resulted in single market laws, designed to regulate overtly economic 
activities, being applied to sporting contexts without due consideration for the specific 
nature of sport.12 The judgment of the Court in Meca-Medina is often cited as another 
example of the insensitive application of single market laws to sporting contexts.13 Meca-
Medina received particular criticism for promoting a case-by-case approach to assessing the 
legality of contested rules, rather than allowing for a more holistic assessment of the 
specific nature of sport.    
 
A second concern is that EU sports policy has lacked status and coherence. Sport has 
become associated not only with single market competences, but with a large number of 
other EU policy areas including, public health policy, education, training and youth policy, 
equal opportunities and disabilities policy, employment policy, environmental policy, media 
policy and cultural policy. However, the ability of the EU to allocate budgetary 
appropriations to this activity was limited by its lack of competence to act in the field of 
sport. Following UK v Commission14 the Commission was compelled to suspend some of its 
sports-related funding programmes and attach these to areas of existing competence in the 
Treaty such as education policy. The competence question has meant that the EU has 
struggled to give sport high status and comprehensive treatment, particularly in an era 
where the EU is being increasingly asked by sports stakeholders to provide a coherent 
response to contemporary challenges in sport.    
 
A potential solution to the above two issues is for sport to find its place within the EU’s 
constitutional framework. On two occasions, during the Amsterdam and Nice Treaty 
negotiations, proponents of a Treaty article for sport failed to persuade the Member States 
of the value of such a move. The convening of the Convention on the Future of Europe set 
in motion a process resulting in the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of an 
article for sport in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Articles 6 and 
165).15 
 
Structured around 6 chapters, this study explores the significance of this article on current 
and pending issues in EU sports law and policy. Chapter 1 explores the meaning and origins 
of key phrases contained in Article 165 including ‘European sporting issues’, the ‘specific 
nature of sport’ and the ‘European dimension of sport’. Chapter 2 explains the 
                                                 
12  For a useful list of critical comments from sports organisations see Chappelet, J-L., (2010), Autonomy of Sport 
in Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pp.89-108. 
13  See for example, Infantino, G., Meca-Medina: a step backwards for the European sports model, accessed at: 
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/KeyTopics/480401_DOWNLOAD.pdf. 
14  Case C-106/96 UK v Commission ECR [1998] I-02729. 
15  All article references, unless otherwise stated, are to the TFEU. 
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constitutional limits to EU action in the field of sport. Chapter 3 explores how the general 
meanings discussed in chapter 1 find legal expression within the context of the application 
of EU free movement and competition laws. Chapter 4 explains the significance of Article 
165 in relation to the EU’s ability to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement 
the actions of the Member States in the field of sport. Chapter 5 presents the findings of 
the study’s consultation exercise which was designed to establish interested stakeholders’ 
preferences and priorities for the implementation of Article 165 TFEU. Finally, chapter 6 
presents conclusions and recommendations.  
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1. SPORT POLICY AND THE SPECIFICITY OF SPORT UNDER 
ARTICLE 165 
 
Article 165(1) TFEU refers to the promotion of ‘European sporting issues’ and 165(2) 
establishes that Union action should be aimed at ‘developing the European dimension in 
sport’. These phrases suggest that sport plays an important role in European society and 
that the EU has a role to play in promoting this and combating common threats and 
challenges. The European dimension in sport must however be carefully defined. Not only 
are spectator loyalties strongly aligned to nation states, but sport in Europe is organised 
according to national traditions and constitutional arrangements. In this respect, patterns 
of governmental involvement in sport follow one of two models. Some states adopt an 
interventionist sports legislation model in which the state adopts a legislative framework 
regulating sport, whilst others favour a non-interventionist model in which the state plays a 
less direct and often merely facilitating function.16 The autonomy of sporting organisations 
and representative structures in Europe has also been recognised by the EU.17 These 
features preclude the EU assuming a primary responsibility for sport. This is acknowledged 
in the wording of Article 6 TFEU which states that in terms of sport, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the 
Member States. Article 165 confirms that these actions exclude the harmonisation of 
national laws.  
 
Despite the complexity and diversity of sport in Europe, there are however certain features, 
values and traditions that give sport a European dimension. Sport is often employed by 
Member States as a means of achieving public policy goals in related fields such as health, 
social inclusion, education and employment. Indeed most, if not all, Member States are 
facing challenges in the areas of obesity, discrimination, violence and racism and it is within 
these contexts that sport can play a role. However, the ‘European dimension’ in sport 
should not be confused with a ‘European model of sport’. Whilst it is true that some sports 
are organised on a pan-European basis by a European governing body, the diversity of 
European sport is such that defining a European model and selecting policy choices on the 
assumption that such a model exists, is inadvisable. In this regard, the EU should only 
provide support to activities where the European dimension in sport can be demonstrated 
and where the added value of EU action can be clearly established.  
 
The EU’s progressive establishment of a single market has also given sport a European 
dimension. For example, the lifting of nationality restrictions and the reform of the 
international transfer system following the Bosman judgment promoted the greater 
movement of players across national borders. In parallel, technological developments in 
European broadcasting, partly supported by the EU’s progressive liberalisation of the 
broadcasting market, transformed the sporting landscape by giving sport, and particularly 
football, access to a new source of income. This commercialisation of sport has increased 
incentives to litigate. The development of a European legal dimension has provided 
stakeholders with rights and enforcement opportunities through which these can be 
defended.    
 
                                                 
16  See Chaker, A.N. (1999), Study of National Sports Legislations in Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.  
17  European Commission (2007), White Paper on Sport, COM(2007), 391 final, p.13, hereafter referred to as 
White Paper on Sport. 
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The reference in Article 165(1) to the ‘specific nature of sport’ is significant insofar as it will 
be raised in the context of future challenges to sporting rules based on inter alia the 
application of EU free movement and competition law. Whilst it is widely accepted that in 
some instances sport operates under different conditions to those found in ‘normal’ 
industries, the boundaries of the concept of the ‘specificity of sport’ are contested. If too 
few specificities are recognised sports markets may not operate effectively, yet recognising 
too many may undermine the fundamental rights of stakeholders within the sector.  
 
Since the Walrave judgment of 1974, the ECJ has contributed to the debate on the 
meaning of the term specificity of sport. In Walrave the Court held that the prohibition on 
nationality discrimination ‘does not affect the composition of sport teams, in particular 
national teams, the formation of which is a question of purely sporting interest and as such 
has nothing to do with economic activity’.18 Later in Bosman it added that ‘in view of the 
considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular football in the 
Community, the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain 
degree of equality and uncertainty as to results…must be accepted as legitimate’.19 In 
Deliège the Court held that ‘limiting the number of participants in a tournament... is 
inherent in the conduct of an international high-level sports event, which necessarily 
involves certain selection rules or criteria being adopted. Such rules may not therefore in 
themselves be regarded as constituting a restriction on the freedom to provide services’.20 
At the same time the Court in Lehtonen found that late transfers could substantially alter 
the sporting strength of teams in the course of the championship thus calling into question 
the proper functioning of sporting competition.21 In Meca-Medina the Court recognised as 
legitimate the need to ‘combat doping in order for competitive sport to be conducted fairly’, 
safeguard ‘equal chances for athletes, athletes’ health,’, ensure ‘the integrity and 
objectivity of competitive sport’ and protect ‘ethical values in sport’.22 Most recently in 
Bernard the Court held that ‘…in considering whether a system which restricts the freedom 
of movement of such players is suitable to ensure that the said objective is attained and 
does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it, account must be taken …of the specific 
characteristics of sport in general, and football in particular, and of their social and 
educational function. The relevance of those factors is also corroborated by their being 
mentioned in the second subparagraph of Article 165(1) TFEU’.23 
 
The Commission has also added to the debate on the meaning of the specific nature of 
sport. In the ENIC Decision the Commission rejected a complaint against UEFA’s rules on 
club ownership on the grounds that the measure was necessary to safeguard the public’s 
perception that games played represent honest sporting competition.24 In the White Paper 
on Sport the Commission argued that there exists specificity of sporting activities and rules 
such as separate competitions for men and women, limitations on the number of 
participations in competitions, or the need to ensure competitive balance in sport. In 
addition, the Commission cited examples of specificity of sports structure which includes 
                                                 
18  Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale ECR [1974] 1405 paragraph 8. 
Hereafter referred to as Walrave. 
19  Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association and others v Bosman and others [1995] 
ECR I-4921, paragraph 106. 
20  Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège v Ligue francophone de Judo et disciplines Associeés Asb [2000] 
ECR I-2549. Hereafter referred to as Deliège. 
21  Case C-176/96 Lehtonen and Castors Braine [2000] ECR I-2681, paragraph 54. 
22  Case C-519/04 P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991, hereafter referred 
to as Meca-Medina. 
23  Case C-325/08, Olympic Lyonnais v Bernard & Newcastle United, paragraph 40. 
24  Case COMP/37 806: ENIC/UEFA, hereafter referred to as ENIC. See also Commission Press Release 
IP/02/942, 27 June 2002, ‘Commission closes investigation into UEFA rule on multiple ownership of football 
clubs’. 
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the autonomy and diversity of sport organisations, the pyramid structure of European 
sport, solidarity in sport, the organisation of sport on a national basis and the principle of a 
single federation per sport.25  
 
The first significant member state contribution came by way of the Amsterdam Declaration 
on Sport which emphasised ‘the social significance of sport… in this connection special 
consideration should be given to the particular characteristics of amateur sport’.26 This was 
followed by the Nice Declaration on the ‘specific characteristics of sport and its social 
function in Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing common policies’.27 
In addition, the Independent European Sport Review, a report undertaken at the initiative 
of the UK sport minister, Richard Caborn, detailed a number of specificity arguments and 
explained why rules designed to promote these features were compatible with EU law.28  
 
A number of other key documents elaborate the meaning of the phrase specific nature of 
sport including recent European Parliament Reports such as the Belet and Mavrommatis 
Reports.29 In addition, statements from sports stakeholders are relevant and these include 
the UEFA/FIFPro Memorandum of Understanding which details their understanding of the 
specificity of sport, the Statement of the European Team Sports, the Common Position of 
the Olympic and Sports Movement on the Implementation of the New Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the Common Position of members of the European 
Elite Athletes Association and Sport PRO-UNI Europa on the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on 
sport.30 Elsewhere, the Court of Arbitration for Sport has interpreted the reference to the 
specificity of sport contained within the FIFA regulations on the Status and Transfer of 
Players.31  
 
From the above, it is evident that a number of specificity themes are emerging. These 
include the mutual interdependence of the sports market, the need to ensure solidarity 
between participants, the need to ensure competitive balance, the need to ensure the 
regularity and proper functioning of competitions, the need to encourage the training and 
education of young players, the need to promote stadium attendance and participation at 
all levels, the need to protect national teams, and the need to ensure fairness and the 
integrity of competition. Some of these specificities remain contested.32 Nevertheless, so as 
                                                 
25  White Paper on Sport, p.13. 
26  Declaration 29 to the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
27  Presidency Conclusions, (2000), Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in 
Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing common policies, Nice European Council Meeting, 
December 2000. 
28  Arnaut, JL., (2006), Independent European Sport Review, p.33. Accessed at 
http://www.independentfootballreview.com/doc/Full_Report_EN.pdf. 
29  European Parliament (2007), Resolution of the European Parliament on the Future of Professional Football in 
Europe, A6-0036/2007, 29 March. (The Belet Report). European Parliament Resolution of May 8 2008 on the 
White Paper on Sport (2007/2261(INI)), (The Mavrommatis Report). 
30  See FIFPro / UEFA Memorandum of Understanding, 11/10/07 accessed at: 
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/KeyTopics/88/17/81/881781_DOWNLOAD.pdf 
 See also Statement of the European Team Sports, 11/07/07 accessed at: 
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/KeyTopics/560675_DOWNLOAD.pdf 
 For the Common position of the Olympic and Sports Movement see: 
http://www.euoffice.eurolympic.org/cms/getfile.php?98 
 For the Common position of the EEAA / Sport PRO-UNI Europa see: 
http://www.euathletes.info/uploads/media/EU_ATHLETES_Common_Position_Paper_FINAL.pdf 
31  See for example CAS 2008/A/1519-1520, Matuzalem. 
32  The literature is too voluminous to summarise here but see for instance, Andreff, W & Szymanski, S. (2006), 
Handbook on the Economics of Sport, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Downward et al (2009), Sports Economics: 
Theory, Evidence and Practice, Oxford: Elsevier; Késenne, S. (2007), The Economic Theory of Professional 
Team Sports, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Szymanski, S. (2009), Playbooks and Checkbooks, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; Jeanrenaud, C., & Késenne, S., (2009), The Economics of Sport and the Media, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Groot, L., (2008), Economics, Uncertainty and European Football, Cheltenham: 
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to provide maximum protection for these specificities, and the regulatory means of 
achieving them, the sports movement itself should take a lead in defining the meaning of 
specificity. It should also take a proactive approach to ensure its regulations are sufficiently 
justified and grounded on solid data, and to demonstrate that they are proportionate to the 
objective pursued. This definition of the specificity to sport should be built into the relevant 
sports regulations following open and transparent method of operation facilitated by the 
governing bodies but involving affected stakeholders. The EU has a strong role to play in 
facilitating this dialogue and ensuring that sporting autonomy is conditioned on the 
implementation of good governance in sport.33 For example, best practice in this respect is 
demonstrated by the European Commission’s promotion of social dialogue in European 
sport. There is a strong case for the social partners, acting within the context of a social 
dialogue committee, to self-define the meaning of specificity and the most appropriate 
means of achieving such objectives. Through other means, such as structured dialogue, the 
EU can assist the sports governing bodies and interested stakeholders in framing rules that 
are likely to comply with the EU law.   
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Edward Elgar; Szymanski, S., (2010), The Comparative Economics of Sport, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan; Szymanski, S., (2010), Football Economics and Policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
33  For a more detailed discussion see Chaker, A-N., (2004), Good Governance in Sport: A European Survey, 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe.  
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2. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON EU ACTION 
 
Sport has been subject to indirect regulation under the founding EU Treaties since long 
before the Lisbon Treaty. The ECJ has consistently declared that sport is subject to EU law 
when it is practiced as economic activity.34 Thus, a sporting practice that restricts freedom 
to work35 or to provide services,36 or competition,37 is prohibited unless it is deemed justified 
and proportionate. Even government acts in allocating sporting powers have been deemed 
subject to the Treaties where they encouraged sporting bodies to abuse a dominant 
position in the national market.38 
 
Despite the direct impact of internal market rules, such as the prohibition of discrimination, 
on many commercial sports, the limits of EU competence have remained slightly unclear. 
Direct funding for sport has been restricted by the lack of competence, but funding has 
subsequently been channelled through areas such as Education where the EU had 
budgetary powers.39 Some Member States have been reluctant to apply and transpose 
those legislative instruments that might be considered to apply to sport, even when 
consistently pursued to do so by the Commission.40 Even the EU legislature has at times 
sought to offer sport exemptions, such as the reference to non-profit activities in the 
directive on services in the internal market.41 Thus, although case law has been relatively 
clear as to the impact of EU law on sport and on the application of appropriate EU rules to 
economic activities within amateur and professional sports, the practical application of 
these rules has been neither complete nor uniform.  
 
Article 165 TFEU represents a new development in so far as it expressly mentions sport as 
an area of EU action. However, evidence and literature on both this and the proposed 
sports competence in the Constitutional Treaty suggests that this development is 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary.42 There are as yet few precedents to offer guidance 
on how this Article will be interpreted and what the many qualifications to the EU sports 
competence will mean in practice. However, Article 165 TFEU is closely modelled on former 
Article 149 EC and resembles other historical Treaty articles on soft competences, including 
former Article 152 EC. Unlike Article 165 TFEU, some of these have been tested before the 
ECJ. Parallels drawn between the present sports competence and other, historical soft 
competences will inform the discussion in this chapter. 
 
                                                 
34  See for example Walrave. 
35  See for example Bosman. 
36  See for example Deliège. 
37  See for example Meca-Medina. 
38  See Case C-49/07 MOTOE [2008], Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 1. July 2008, hereafter referred to as 
MOTOE. 
39  See Case 106/96 Commission v UK; the subsequent European Year of Education through Sport was based on 
a pre-existing competence to fund educational, rather than sporting, initiatives.  
40  See for example Case C-200/08, on the ongoing refusal of certain Member States to recognise the 
qualifications of ski instructors. 
41  See recital 35 of Directive 2006/123, which states that ‘Non-profit making amateur sporting activities are of 
considerable social importance. They often pursue wholly social or recreational objectives. Thus, they might 
not constitute economic activities within the meaning of Community law and should fall outside the scope of 
this Directive.’. 
42  Van den Bogaert, S., and Vermeersch, A., ‘Sport in the European Constitution: All Sound and No Fury?’ 
Maastricht University Working Paper No 2005/8 available at  
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=977456; Van den Bogaert, S., and Vermeersch, A., 
(2006), ‘Sport & the European Treaty: A Tale of Uneasy Bedfellows?’, European Law Review, 31, pp. 821-840 
; Vermeersch, A., (2009), ‘The Future EU Sports Policy: Hollow Words on Hallowed Ground?’, 3-4 
International Sports Law Journal pp. 3-7. 
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As has been observed above, the EU operates on the basis of the principle of conferral: it is 
only able to exercise those powers that have been conferred on it.43 In this respect, the 
Article 165 TFEU sports competence contains several reservations as to the powers which 
have been conferred upon the EU. Whilst powers are awarded in order to ‘contribute to the 
promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport’, 
it is not clear that ‘taking into account... the specific nature of sport’ is a horizontal 
obligation which applies to the exercise of other EU powers. This compares unfavourably 
with Article 168 TFEU on public health. Like Article 165, it provides for incentive measures 
and expressly excludes harmonisation. However, unlike Article 165 the Article 168(1) 
requires that ‘A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Union policies and activities’, thus mainstreaming this level of 
protection of human health into all Union action. 
 
In other words, the EU may, and may indeed be required to, take into account the specific 
nature of sport when exercising its powers under Article 165(1) TFEU to ‘contribute to the 
promotion of European sporting issues’. However, it is less clear that it is constitutionally 
required to take into account sporting issues or the specific nature of sport when 
considering non-sporting legislation that could have impacts on sport. If this interpretation 
is correct, the Treaty article on sport differs substantially from the horizontal clauses in the 
TFEU which relate to some other competences. Most notably, the EU has historically been 
obliged to take into account environmental protection requirements, now enshrined in 
Article 11 TFEU, which states that ‘[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be 
integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities...’. 
The TFEU mainstreams several other considerations into all EU action: Title II general 
provisions list the promotion of equality between men and women,44 ‘the promotion of a 
high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against 
social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health ‘,45 
combating discrimination on the basis of ‘sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation’46 and ‘Consumer protection requirements’47 as 
questions that must be taken into account even when legislating outside these fields.  
 
Thus, an internal market measure that is not aimed at environmental, equality, or 
consumer protection regulation must on the basis of Articles 8, 9, 10, and 12 TFEU 
nevertheless take account of all of these issues. This is the case even when the measure is 
not based on a legislative competence to achieve any of these mainstreamed interests but 
instead finds a legal basis for example in the very general Article 114 TFEU power to take 
measures for the ‘establishment and functioning of the internal market’. It does not appear 
likely that Article 165 TFEU has inserted a similar horizontal requirement to consider sport, 
much less the specificity of sport, when taking action in other fields. Thus, whilst it seems a 
reasonable interpretation that direct EU action based on Article 165 TFEU must take into 
account the specific nature of sport, the validity of legislation in other fields is unlikely to be 
compromised by a failure to consider its impact on sporting activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43  See Article 5 TEU and Article 7 TFEU. 
44  Article 8 TFEU. 
45  Article 9 TFEU. 
46  Article 10 TFEU. 
47  Article 12 TFEU. 
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This is not to say that sport cannot, will not, or ought not be considered when taking action 
in other fields. Indeed, some noteworthy recent initiatives do precisely this, and as a 
consequence occasionally attempt to exclude certain impacts on sport.48 Sporting interests 
are also key considerations in ECJ case law. In the Bernard judgment, the Court confirmed 
that the Article 165 TFEU reference to the specific characteristics of sport strengthened 
arguments that they should be taken into account when examining the legality of 
restrictions to freedom of movement.49 However, Article 165 TFEU seems to stop short of 
imposing a constitutional requirement to do so in either legislative or administrative action. 
At least in the Bernard judgment, reference to the specific characteristics of sport merely 
reinforces judicial possibilities which were already open prior to the passage of the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
 
The opportunities to give sports governing bodies a wide margin of appreciation are 
substantial even if Article 165 TFEU stops short of imposing a constitutional requirement to 
do so. It is clear that the EU legal framework is already capable of accommodating many 
sporting practices where it considers it appropriate to do so, even if those practices might 
be called into question were they to be found in other contexts. The best example of 
legislation which expressly seeks to achieve this is Recital 35 of the Services Directive, 
which seeks to provide exemptions to non-profit activity carried out to financially support 
sport.50 However, most of the rules tailored to sport can be found in case law.  In the 
Walrave judgment, the ECJ made a distinction between ‘purely sporting rules’ that had 
nothing to do with economic activity, and those that had impacts on economic activity.51 
The judgment also suggested that nationality discrimination, otherwise clearly prohibited by 
the Treaties, was not relevant to ‘the composition of sports teams, in particular national 
teams’.52 Whilst the extent of the exemptions given to sports in both of these 
interpretations have since been curtailed by modern case law,53 Walrave shows that judicial 
avenues for the special treatment of sport may be available even in the absence of an 
express constitutional exemption for sport.  Three modern methods go beyond the limited 
exemption in Walrave and enable sporting practices to receive sensitive treatment even in 
the absence of legislative special treatment. First, rules that are ‘inherent’ to the proper 
conduct of sport may in some circumstances not fall within the EU Treaty. Secondly, rules 
that do fall within the EU Treaty because they are restrictions of freedom of movement may 
be justified, by reference to both grounds found in the Treaty itself and to objective 
justifications developed before the ECJ. Competition law and free movement both also 
entail grounds of justification found in the Treaties. Third, the legal framework may be 
applied to sport in a sensitive way in those cases where it contains few sport-specific 
exceptions. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
48  See for example Recital 35 in Directive 2006/123, which seeks to provide some exemptions to non-profit 
activities carried out to support amateur sports. For a counter-example, see the professional qualifications 
framework and the ongoing, decades-long Ski instructors saga, recently revisited in case C-200/08.  
49  Case C-325/08 at paragraph 40. 
50  See Recital 35 of Directive 2006/123. 
51  Walrave paragraph 4. Although this originally suggested that non-economic sporting activity was outside the 
scope of the Treaty and was subject to EU law ‘only in so far as it constitutes economic activity’, subsequent 
cases do not impose the same delimitation, including economic activity but failing to rule out impacts on non-
economic activity.  See in this respect for example Bosman. 
52  Walrave paragraph 8. 
53  See for example Case 13/76 Donà and Mantero [1976] ECR 1333, paragraph 19. On the development of the 
‘sporting exception’, see Parrish, R., and Miettinen, S., (2008), The Sporting Exception in European Union 
Law, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, pp. 73-101. 
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The first of these methods involves judicial recognition that some practices ‘inherent’ to 
sport are not contrary to EU law. According to ECJ case law, ‘inherent’ rules are exempt 
because they are not restrictions of free movement or competition, and are therefore not 
governed by those Treaty provisions. Thus, in Deliège, the Court considered that national 
selection criteria which enabled only a limited number of athletes to participate were 
inherent to the conduct of high-level sport, and therefore did not in law constitute 
restrictions of free movement.54 Similar reasoning was applied in Meca-Medina to explain 
why anti-doping rules were not de jure restrictions of economic competition under Article 
101 TFEU even though they de facto clearly restricted athletes from competing in sporting 
events with the aid of doping.55 Thus, recognition of the ‘inherent’ nature of a sporting 
practice could offer one method of minimising the impact of EU law where it might 
otherwise apply.56  
 
The second method clearly supported by modern case law involves justifying rules which 
would ordinarily be considered restrictions of free movement or competition.  Both freedom 
of movement and competition may be restricted by reference to justificatory grounds found 
in the Treaty.  For freedom of movement these include the public policy, public health, and 
public security derogations57 as well as an exception for employment in the public service.58 
Agreements which restrict competition may be exempted on economic grounds expressed 
in Article 101(3) TFEU: If an otherwise prohibited agreement ‘contributes to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit’ and is proportionate, it may be 
permitted. In addition to the grounds found in the Treaty, the ECJ has accepted reference 
to other, sometimes sports-specific objective justifications which can be relied upon when 
applying the ordinary EU rules to sport. It could be argued that in accepting and developing 
these, the Court has demonstrated its sensitivity to the specific features of sporting 
activities. These might in competition law be reasons why a practice is not a restriction 
within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU or an abuse under Article 102 TFEU.59 They are also 
a very clearly established category under the freedom of movement provisions of the 
TFEU.60 In EU free movement law, rules which (unlike ‘inherent’ rules) do constitute 
restrictions can be justified if they are proportionate and pursue a legitimate objective.61 
Such legitimate objectives have included for example ‘the aims of maintaining a balance 
between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and 
of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players’.62 There is no reason to 
believe that the list should be exhaustive, and that other objective justifications could not 
be invoked. Indeed, in the Bernard case, the ECJ suggested that the specific features of 
sport, some of which are listed in Article 165 TFEU, might even affect its interpretation of 
                                                 
54  Deliège paragraph 64.  
55  Meca-Medina paragraphs 42 and 45. If a rule is outside the scope of the Treaty, so too, arguably, is any 
examination of proportionality. Free movement and competition may differ in this respect: whilst 
proportionality did not feature in the Deliège judgment, the Court pointedly observed in the Meca-Medina 
case that there was no evidence to suggest the disproportionality of the doping rules. 
56  Whilst there are many similarities between ‘inherent’ rules in free movement and competition, they may yet 
be conclusively demonstrated to enjoy analytically different treatment. 
57  See for example Article 45(3) and (4) TFEU.  A detailed examination of these is beyond the scope of this 
Study. 
58  In the context of self-employment, a similar exception is included for activities involving the exercise of 
official authority. 
59  See for example paragraph 45 in Meca-Medina which refers to ‘legitimate objectives’ in the context of rules 
‘inherent in the proper conduct of sport’. There are sound constitutional reasons beyond the scope of this 
study which explain the awkward marriage between ‘inherent’ rules and ‘legitimate objectives’. 
60  In relation to persons, see the prohibitions in Articles 21 TFEU(citizens), 45 TFEU (workers), 49 TFEU 
(establishment), 56 TFEU (services), and 63  TFEU(Capital) as well as Articles 30-36 TFEU which govern 
goods. 
61  See for example Gebhard, paragraph 37. 
62  Bosman paragraph 106. 
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proportionality, namely whether a practice ‘is suitable to ensure that the said objective is 
attained and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it’.63 However, sporting 
practices must conform to the general principles of EU law when they are within the scope 
of the Treaty. Thus, the Meca-Medina judgment turned not on whether it was legitimate to 
control doping in sport, but whether the rules that were in place to achieve that aim were 
proportionate. In freedom of movement cases, similar requirements apply to objective 
justifications: proportionality requires that measures which justifiably restrict freedom of 
movement must be the least restrictive measures and that they must be suitable for 
achieving their aims.64    
 
Thirdly, it is also possible to demonstrate some sensitivity when applying the internal 
market legal framework to sport. Examples of this include portraying conventional 
competition decisions as questions of sport, applying freedom of movement rules in 
unusual ways, and in at least one case, issuing a decision that seems at odds with the 
framework on which it is based. In some cases, it has been argued that the ordinary 
framework has been applied in an unusual way in sporting contexts.  Perhaps the best 
example of the sensitivity to sporting interests is the Commission’s decision to approve the 
3+2 rule in European football which was subsequently successfully challenged in Bosman. 
The Deliège judgment can be argued to apply the otherwise conventional market access 
test in an unusually permissive way to rules restricting athletes’ access to sporting 
competitions.65  In Bosman, even the Court of Justice seemed in principle open to the 
possibility of justifying direct nationality discrimination with reference to reasons not found 
in the Treaty even though direct nationality discrimination is ordinarily only justifiable on 
the basis of limited grounds found in the Treaty.66 Some decisions claim, without accessible 
analysis, that a particular sporting practice is not contrary to EU law. A notable example of 
this is the unreported Mouscron decision which concerned a restriction that teams may only 
use domestic stadia as home game venues. In its press release, the Commission suggested 
that these were ‘not called into question’ by EU law67 even though intentionally partitioning 
the internal market is generally considered an anticompetitive act almost beyond any 
justification. In a speech prior to the Commission’s UEFA Champions League decision, the 
Competition Commissioner suggested that collective selling may be justified if it contributed 
to solidarity in sport.68 However, the subsequent decision was silent on this matter and was 
in fact based on an application of conventional competition rules.69 Thus, in at least these 
cases, it could be argued that the Commission and the Court have applied the ordinary 
internal market rules to sport in a way that is at the very least sensitive to the particular 
needs of sport. The examination of the ways in which EU law has been applied to sport and 
developed to better suit the needs of sport suggests some sensitivity to the needs of the 
sport even before the insertion of the sports competence into the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union.  
 
 
 
                                                 
63  Bernard paragraph 40. 
64  See generally Gebhard paragraph 37. 
65  See further Van den Bogaert, S., (2000), ‘The court of justice on the Tatami: Ippon, Wazari or Koka?’ 
European Law Review 554-563 at pp. 560-561. 
66  Bosman, paragraphs 131-135, contrasting with both earlier and later case law on this point: See for example 
Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders paragraph 32 and Case C-388/01 Commission v Italy paragraph 19. 
67  See ‘Limits to application of Treaty competition rules to sport: Commission gives clear signal’  press release 
IP/99/965, 9th December 1999. 
68  Monti, M., (2001), ‘Competition and Sport, the Rules of the Game’, speech at conference on Governance in 
Sport, 26/02/2001, Brussels. 
69  Decision 2003/778 OJ 2003 L291/25. 
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If Article 165 TFEU neither requires sport to be mainstreamed into the ordinary legislative 
process nor encourages special treatment beyond the substantial concessions already made 
prior the Lisbon Treaty, the question then arises whether it excludes the regulation of sport 
through other Treaty legal bases. At first sight, Article 165(4) TFEU suggests some limits: 
The sporting competence entails the adoption of ‘incentive measures, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’. This might encourage 
claims that the laws and regulations of the Member States cannot be harmonised in so far 
as this would affect sporting practices. However, an examination of past prohibitions of 
harmonisation and their treatment by the ECJ suggests that other competences remain 
unaffected by a limit to a sector-specific competence such as that found in Article 165(4) 
TFEU. Consequently, measures to harmonise such areas can be taken despite this type of 
prohibition so long as the harmonising measures are nominally based on another Treaty 
competence.   
 
Despite similarly worded prohibitions of harmonisation in the fields of social policy,70 
education,71 vocational training,72 culture,73 public health,74 the EU has in practice achieved 
convergence in legislation through other legal bases. In Bosman, the Court observed that a 
link to cultural issues (a supporting competence much like the present Article 165 TFEU) 
could not affect the application of internal market rules to sport.75 The surprisingly 
unequivocal case law on this point is exemplified by the Tobacco Advertising judgments. 
These demonstrate that a prohibition on harmonisation found in one Treaty article is likely 
to impose very few, if any, limits on the use of other legal bases to that effect.  In Tobacco 
Advertising II, the ECJ was asked to consider whether Article 95 EC (now 114 TFEU) could 
be used to prohibit tobacco advertising even though Article 152(4) EC (now 155(5) TFEU) 
expressly prohibited ‘any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’ 
for public health purposes. The ECJ accepted that public health considerations may be a 
‘decisive factor’ in harmonising legislation based on the general internal market 
harmonisation competence76 despite the prohibition on harmonising measures in the field of 
public health.77 It noted that even though the public health competence could not be relied 
upon to prohibit tobacco advertising, since it expressly excluded harmonising measures, the 
limit applied only to the public health competence and thus did not preclude other 
competences that potentially allowed such measures to be adopted. It is striking that the 
ECJ considered this to be the case even if the ultimate motives of the legislator were to 
protect public health through harmonising measures of the sort that were prohibited. Thus, 
the use of the internal market competence successfully avoided the constitutional 
restriction on public health measures. So long as the measures in fact contributed to the 
functioning of the internal market and conditions for the exercise of the general power of 
harmonisation were therefore formally met, the other motives of the legislator were 
irrelevant. As AG Kokott has later summarised the case law on the public health prohibition 
of harmonisation, these ‘judgments state that the lawfulness of a measure adopted by the 
legislature can be affected only if it is manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective 
which the competent institution seeks to pursue.’78. 
 
                                                 
70  Article 137(2)(a) EC. 
71  Article 149(4) EC, the predecessor of Article 165 TFEU. 
72  Article 150(4) EC. 
73  Article 151(5) EC. 
74  Article 152(4)(c) EC. 
75  Bosman paragraph 78. 
76  Article 95 EC, now Article 114 TFEU. 
77  See Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising), paragraph 92. 
78  Case C-558/07 point 74, citing Case C-434/02 Arnold André [2004] ECR I-11825, paragraph 46; Case 
C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, paragraph 48; and Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 
Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005] ECR I-6451, paragraph 52. 
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Article 165(4) TFEU reads much like the former public health competence as regards its 
prohibition on harmonisation. Unless the case for excluding sport is made with more 
success than that for excluding harmonisation with public health impacts, it seems unlikely 
that Article 165(4) TFEU will prevent harmonising legislation with impacts on sport so long 
as that legislation is formally based on a Treaty article other than Article 165 TFEU. Article 
114 TFEU allows for general measures to harmonise legislation for the purposes of 
furthering the internal market, but is hardly the only legal base that could be used to 
regulate sport. For example, Article 46 TFEU enables the EU to ‘issue directives or make 
regulations setting out the measures required to bring about freedom of movement for 
workers’. Although many such measures have applied to all workers, there is no 
constitutional bar to legislation which achieves this in the context of one specific sector. 
Thus, Article 46 TFEU could in theory be used to create legislation enabling the freedom of 
movement for employed sportspersons.  
 
Even though Article 165 TFEU is unlikely to substantially limit powers found in other parts 
of the Treaties, those powers that the EU has which are derived solely from Article 165 
TFEU are clearly limited. In addition to the express prohibition of harmonisation based on 
Article 165 TFEU, it should be noted that measures contributing to objectives in Article 165 
TFEU are ‘incentive measures’. Similar words can be found in the Treaty provisions on other 
supporting competences.79 It is not entirely clear at which point a constitutionally permitted 
incentive measure becomes a prohibited harmonising measure. However, given the Court’s 
lenient approach to the analogous public health prohibition, whether Article 165 TFEU 
permits hard legal measures seems an academic question since these could in all likelihood 
be justified with reference to other Treaty provisions such as Article 114 TFEU even where 
they were clearly intended to also govern sports.  
 
The ECJ’s treatment of Article 165 TFEU in the Bernard case supports the view that whilst 
the new sports competence in Article 165 TFEU may have given further weight to sports-
related arguments, it has not opened many new previously undiscovered avenues of 
appeal. In the only judgment at the time of writing to have considered Article 165 TFEU, 
the ECJ embarked on a rather traditional analysis of the domestic rules in question. It 
briefly observed that sport was subject to EU law,80 and confirmed a professional 
sportsperson was a worker within the scope of Article 45 TFEU.81 The form in which the 
domestic rules were found, namely a collective agreement, did not prevent the EU treaty 
from applying to them.82 The Court’s reasoning continued on orthodox grounds, reasserting 
the established principle that freedom of movement protects not only from discrimination, 
but also from domestic practices which ‘preclude or deter a national of a Member State 
from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement’.83 
After finding that domestic rules could constitute a restriction to that worker’s freedom of 
movement, the Court then identified justifications to such restrictions. It is in this context 
that the ECJ finally relied on Article 165 TFEU. Even then, its reference was not an attempt 
to justify treating sport in a particular, different way, but merely provided further support 
for justifications already accepted prior to the Treaty reforms.84 This justification was 
ultimately rejected on the basis of conventional analysis. Whilst the Court accepted that a 
training compensation scheme could in principle constitute a justified restriction to free 
                                                 
79  See for example Articles  149, 167, 168, 169 and 173 TFEU all of which provide for the exclusion of 
harmonisation. It seems likely that the Tobacco Advertisement judgments will be revisited in other contexts. 
80  Bernard paragraphs 27-28. 
81  Bernard paragraph 29. 
82  Bernard paragraphs 30-32. 
83  Bernard paragraph 34. 
84  Bernard paragraph 40. 
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movement,85 on the facts of the case it was not proportionate because it went beyond what 
was necessary to compensate for the actual costs of training.86 Thus, whilst the Bernard 
case did not explore the constitutional boundaries of the EU’s new sporting competence, in 
employing Article 165 TFEU merely as a further consideration in its conventional analysis, 
the Court provided few reasons to believe that the new sporting competence has any 
substantial impact on the pre-existing acquis which applies to sport. Thus, whilst Article 
165 TFEU introduces solid foundations for funding sporting activities, it neither encourages 
nor requires restrictions to the regulation of economic sporting activity under other legal 
bases. Recognition for the specificity of sport continues to be possible under these 
provisions even if they are not materially altered by the introduction of Article 165 TFEU. 
                                                 
85  Bernard paragraph 45. 
86  Bernard paragraphs 46-48. 
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3. THE ‘SPECIFIC NATURE’ OF SPORT, ‘FAIRNESS’ AND 
‘OPENESS’ IN THE CONTEXT OF EU FREE MOVEMENT 
AND COMPETITION LAWS 
 
Not all rules of sports governing bodies designed to promote the specificities of sport 
discussed in chapter 1 have been tested against the requirements of EU law, particularly 
those relating to free movement and competition. Article 165(2) TFEU inter alia aims to 
develop the European dimension in sport by ‘promoting fairness and openness in sporting 
competitions’. This chapter discusses the possible impact of the words ‘fairness’ and 
‘openness’ in relation to a number of ongoing issues in European sport. 
3.1. Collective sale of sports rights 
The collective sale of sports media rights is an established, although not universally 
adopted, commercial practice within the sports sector. Collective selling gives rise to 
competition law concerns as it amounts to a horizontal restriction under Article 101(1) 
TFEU. Nevertheless, collective selling is defended on the grounds that it allows rights 
holders to maximise revenues thus facilitating the redistribution of wealth within sport. This 
promotes both grass roots development and competitive balance. In a line of competition 
law decisions, the European Commission has insisted that whilst the collective sale of 
sports rights is permissible under European law, exclusivity - the practice of selling rights to 
one broadcaster - is not.87 For example, in the UEFA Champions League case,88 the 
Commission exempted the agreement under Article 101(3) TFEU by concluding that the 
new collective selling regime improves production and distribution by creating a quality 
branded league focused product sold via a single point of sale which allows consumers to 
benefit. Collective selling, it concluded, is indispensable in terms of UEFA achieving these 
objectives and is unlikely to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
media rights in question. The Commission was satisfied that the unbundling of the rights 
into packages should enhance the possibility for more broadcasters to acquire Champions 
League rights. It is clear from this assessment that the exemption decision was made out 
with reference to the economic exemption criteria established in 101(3) TFEU and not to 
wider social-cultural concerns, whether Treaty based or not. Article 165 TFEU does not 
adjust the proposition that the grounds for exempting a sporting practice must be located 
within the exemption criteria contained in Article 101(3) TFEU. The reference to the 
‘specific nature of sport’ contained with Article 165 cannot be cited as the reason for 
exempting a practice should the 101(3) exemption criteria not be satisfied.89 
3.2. Rules designed to promote the local training of players 
New eligibility criteria were incorporated into the 2006/07 UEFA regulations. The rule has 
the effect of reserving a number of places in a club’s 25 man squad to ‘locally trained 
players’. A locally trained player is either a ‘club trained player’ or an ‘association trained 
player’ who has been registered with his/her current club for a period, continuous or non-
continuous, of three entire seasons or of 36 months whilst between the age of 15 and 21. 
Nationality does not form part of the eligibility criteria. UEFA argues that the rule is needed 
in order to promote fairness in European competitions, particularly in relation to the 
promotion of competitive balance, the need to encourage the education and training of 
                                                 
87  UEFA Champions League Decision 2003/778 OJ 2003 L291/25. Bundesliga Decision 2005/396 OJ 2005 
L134/46. Football Association Premier League Decision C(2006) 868. 
88  Decision 2003/778 OJ 2003 L291/25. 
89  See however the possibility that such a rule is ‘inherent’ to the proper organisation of sport, discussed above. 
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young players and the need to protect national teams. Before Article 165 TFEU entered into 
force, the European Commission indicated that the rule was potentially compatible with EU 
law as, although the measure may lead to indirect nationality discrimination, it pursues the 
legitimate objectives of promoting training for young players and consolidating the balance 
of competitions.90 Consequently, the entering into force of the TFEU does not alter this 
already favourable assessment.  
 
Similarly, Article 165 TFEU does not alter the Commission’s negative assessment of the 
6+5 rule proposed by FIFA. This proposal states that a football club must begin a game 
with at least six players entitled to play for the national team of the country where the club 
concerned is located. As with UEFA’s rule, FIFA aims to promote fairness in European 
competitions by guaranteeing equality in sporting and financial terms between clubs, 
promoting junior players, improving the quality of national teams, and strengthening the 
regional and national identification of clubs and a corresponding link with the public.91 
According to the Commission, the proposal is incompatible with EU free movement law as 
the measure gives rise to direct nationality discrimination. Article 165 TFEU does not offer 
protection for such discriminatory acts as the defences remain restricted to those cited in 
Article 45 TFEU, namely public policy, public security and public health.92 The absence of 
horizontality between Articles 165 and 45 TFEU means that sport specific considerations, 
based on the specificity of sport, do not require the reinterpretation of the defences cited in 
Article 45. The 60th FIFA Congress meeting in Johannesburg in June 2010 decided to 
withdraw the 6+5 proposal.  
3.3. Rules regulating the status and transfer of players93 
Following the ECJ’s judgment in Bosman, an agreement was reached between FIFA, UEFA 
and the European Commission concerning the remodeled international transfer system for 
football players. The agreement was concluded in March 2001 by way of an exchange of 
letters between the Commission and FIFA President Sepp Blatter.94 In July 2001 FIFA’s 
Executive Committee adopted a new set of international transfer rules in line with the 
March 2001 principles and these have been subsequently amended. The current regulations 
were published in October 2009.95 
 
These regulations contain a number of restrictions on a player’s free movement. The 
restrictions are defended on the grounds that they promote a fair balance between the 
interests of the clubs, players and the game as a whole. For example, Article 6 states that 
‘players may only be registered during one of the two annual registration periods fixed by 
the relevant association’. In Lehtonen, the Court considered that although a transfer 
window amounted to a restriction, it may be justified as late season transfers could 
substantially alter the sporting strength of teams in the course of the championship and 
thus call into question the proper functioning of sporting competition.96 Consequently, the 
ECJ has already recognised that transfer windows can promote fair competition and in this 
light Article 165 TFEU can offer no further protection for such rules.  
 
                                                 
90  Commission Press Release IP/08/807, ‘UEFA rule on home-grown players: compatibility with the principles of 
free movement of persons’, 28/05/08. 
91  As stated in the Institute of European Affairs Report, ‘Expert opinion regarding the compatibility of the 6+5 
rule with European Community law’, 24/10/08. 
92  The possibility that the Court may in Bosman have invited the extra-Treaty objective justification of such 
arrangements, discussed in chapter 2 above, has not been successfully attempted. 
93  Articles 13-18, FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, October 2009. 
94  Letter from Mario Monti to Joseph S. Blatter, 5.03.01 D/000258.   
95  FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, July 2001. 
96  Case C-176/96 Lehtonen and Castors Braine [2000] ECR I-2681. Paragraph 54. 
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Articles 13-18 of the FIFA Regulations are designed to promote contract stability between 
professionals and clubs. Once again, a number of restrictions on a players free movement 
are evident within these provisions, such as the provision for a ‘protected period’ of a 
players contract and the sanctions on that player that flow from a breach of that provision 
(Article 17). Such restrictions are justified by FIFA on the grounds that they promote 
contract stability and youth development and that they promote team building and fans’ 
association with teams. Article 20 provides that ‘training compensation shall be paid to a 
player’s training club(s): (1) when a player signs his first contract as a professional and (2) 
each time a professional is transferred until the end of the season of his 23rd birthday. The 
obligation to pay training compensation arises whether the transfer takes place during or at 
the end of the player’s contract’. Whilst this system places potential restrictions on a 
player’s free movement, the provisions are potentially justified with reference to the need 
to encourage investment into youth development. In Bernard, the first post-TFEU sports 
case of the Court of Justice, Article 165 TFEU was cited to corroborate the Court’s view that 
the specific characteristics of sport allow football clubs to seek compensation for the 
training of their young players where those players wish to sign their first professional 
contract with a club in another Member State.97 Bernard is notable for the Court’s reference 
to Article 165 although this does not imply a deviation from the Court’s traditional 
treatment of sport. In paragraph 41 of the judgment, the Court reiterated its view first 
expressed in paragraph 108 of Bosman that the prospect of receiving training fees is likely 
to encourage football clubs to seek new talent and train young players. Article 165 does not 
compel the Court to arrive at this assessment, it is simply used to confirm the Court’s long 
held view.  
3.4. Anti-doping rules 
In Meca-Medina the Court of Justice considered a challenge brought by two swimmers 
against a doping sanction imposed on them following a failed test. Having been suspended 
for four years, reduced to two on appeal, the swimmers filed a complaint with the European 
Commission alleging a breach of EU competition laws. The competition law claim was 
founded on the accusation that the setting of the prescribed doping limit was a concerted 
practice between the IOC and the 27 laboratories accredited by it, that the limit was 
scientifically unfounded and could lead to the exclusion of innocent or merely negligent 
athletes, and that the establishment of tribunals responsible for the settlement of sports 
disputes by arbitration (such as the CAS) were insufficiently independent of the IOC thus 
strengthening the anti-competitive nature of that limit.  
 
The Commission rejected the complaint by finding that the contested rules fell outside the 
scope of the Treaty.98 On appeal, the Court of First Instance largely agreed by finding that 
anti-doping rules concerned an exclusively ‘…non-economic aspect of that sporting action, 
which constitutes its very essence’.99 On further appeal, the ECJ dismissed this reasoning 
by finding that ‘it is apparent that the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does 
not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the 
activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down’.100 In determining 
whether the contested rule fell within the scope of Article 101 TFEU, the Court found that 
‘account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the 
association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its 
objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of 
                                                 
97  Case C-325/08, Olympic Lyonnais v Bernard & Newcastle United, judgment of 16 March 2010. The reference 
to Article 165 TFEU is to be found at paragraph 40. 
98  COMP 38.158, Meca-Medina and Majcen, Decision of 1 August 2002.  
99  Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission [2004] ECR II-3291 paragraph 45. 
100  Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina and Majcen [2006] ECR I-6991 paragraph 27. 
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competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives… and are proportionate to them’ 
.101 
 
In terms of the context in which the doping rule was adopted, the Court took the view that 
anti-doping measures had as their legitimate objective questions of fairness, equality of 
arms for athletes, athletes’ health, the integrity and objectivity of competitive sport and 
ethical values in sport.102 The anti-doping rules do not infringe EU competition law because 
they are ‘inherent in the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport and its very 
purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry between athletes’.103 Nevertheless, the court 
acknowledged that the sanctions attached to anti-doping rules ‘are capable of producing 
adverse effects on competition because they could, if penalties were ultimately to prove 
unjustified, result in an athlete’s unwarranted exclusion from sporting events, and thus in 
impairment of the conditions under which the activity at issue is engaged in. It follows that, 
in order to escape condemnation under Article 101 TFEU, anti-doping rules must be limited 
to what is necessary to ensure the proper conduct of competitive sport’.104 Anti-doping 
rules are thus subject to proportionality control. The Court has already accepted that anti-
doping measures are necessary in order to ensure fairness in competitions. Article 165 
TFEU is unlikely to improve upon this assessment much less be interpreted as a means 
through which anti-doping measures can escape proportionality control. Indeed, a failure 
by those imposing anti-doping sanctions to respect the proportionality principle would lead 
those affected by the sanction to raise the issue of ‘fairness’ cited in Article 165 TFEU in 
support of their challenge.    
3.5. Player release rules designed to promote national team sports 
In the Charleroi/Oulmers case, the ECJ was due to hear a challenge to FIFA’s mandatory 
player release rule and the structure of the international match calendar brought by Belgian 
football club Charleroi and the G14 grouping of leading clubs.105 The case was settled out of 
court by way of an agreement based on the grant of a financial compensation package for 
the clubs and changes to UEFA’s governance structures to allow greater representation of 
the clubs. In return, UEFA secured the disbandment of the G14 association of leading clubs 
and its replacement with a new European Club Association (ECA) based on a wider 
membership. Although the case has been settled, Article 165 TFEU would not adjust the 
basis on which the Court would decide the matter. In terms of the application of EU 
competition law, the Court would most likely follow the Meca-Medina methodology. As with 
Bernard, Article 165 TFEU would no more than corroborate the view that sport possesses 
special characteristics and that some form of player release and international match 
calendar fixing is necessary to secure the viability of international sport. It is therefore 
possible that these two features would be considered to be inherent in the operation of 
international football and therefore incapable of being defined as restrictions. This 
assessment would however need to satisfy proportionality control. Less restrictive and 
more democratic means of achieving the objective were not pursued under the existing 
system which was therefore susceptible to condemnation under the proportionality 
principle. Indeed, stakeholders affected by the rule would raise the question of fairness in 
support of their challenge to the rules.   
 
                                                 
101  Meca-Medina (ECJ) paragraph 45. 
102  Meca-Medina (ECJ) paragraph 42. 
103  Meca-Medina (ECJ) paragraph 45. 
104  Meca-Medina (ECJ) paragraph 47. 
105  Case C-243/06 SA Sporting du Pays de Charleroi, G-14 Groupment des Clubs de Football Européens v 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal 
de Commerce de Charleroi lodged on 30 May 2006 OJ C/212 2.9.2006 p.11. Removed from the Court 
register by order of the President of the Court of 25 November 2008 OJ C/69 21.3.2009 p.30. 
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3.6. Licensing conditions, financial fair play and salary capping 
Licensing refers to criteria set by sports federations or leagues that must be adhered to 
before clubs can participate in competitions. For example, the new 2010 UEFA Club 
Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations establish a set of sporting, infrastructure, 
personnel and administrative, legal and financial criteria. The new regulations aim to 
further promote and continuously improve the standard of all aspects of football in Europe 
and to give continued priority to the training and care of young players in every club; 
ensure that a club has an adequate level of management and organisation; adapt clubs’ 
sporting infrastructure to provide players, spectators and media representatives with 
suitable, well-equipped and safe facilities; protect the integrity and smooth running of the 
UEFA club competitions; and allow the development of benchmarking for clubs in financial, 
sporting, legal, personnel, administrative and infrastructure-related criteria throughout 
Europe.106 The new 2010 regulations also include the new financial fair play requirement, at 
the heart of which lies the ‘break-even requirement’. This enters into force for the financial 
statements of the reporting period ending 2012, to be assessed during the 2013/14 UEFA 
club competitions season. Under the scheme, over a period of time, relevant expenses 
must align with relevant income. If a club’s relevant expenses are greater than relevant 
income for a reporting period, the club has a breakeven deficit. This must not be greater 
than €5 million although larger deficits, currently up to €45 million, are permitted if covered 
by contributions from benefactors. The new provisions on financial fair play aim to improve 
the economic and financial capability of the clubs, increasing their transparency and 
credibility; place the necessary importance on the protection of creditors by ensuring that 
clubs settle their liabilities with players, social/tax authorities and other clubs punctually; 
introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances; encourage clubs to 
operate on the basis of their own revenues; encourage responsible spending for the long-
term benefit of football; and protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European 
club football. 
 
In theory such licensing requirements amount to a barrier to entry to the market and are 
prone to capture within Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Traditionally, European sport has 
operated an ‘open’ model in which sporting success, as opposed to financial criteria, 
determines access to competitions. Nevertheless, club licensing pursues important 
objectives, with questions of fairness being paramount. Whilst the Commission and the 
Court have yet to form a legal opinion on the operation of licensing systems, they may be 
encouraged to refer to Article 165 TFEU references to fairness. Nevertheless, the formal 
grounds for deciding this issue are likely to rest on whether the objectives of the UEFA 
scheme are considered to derive from a need inherent in the organisation of sporting 
competitions. Providing that these rules do not go beyond what is necessary for the 
attainment of these objectives, they could be deemed to fall outside the scope of the Treaty 
competition provisions without reliance on Article 165 TFEU. This finding is heightened 
given the manner in which the rules were negotiated with representatives of football clubs.  
 
Alternatively, in instances where rules cannot be considered ‘inherent’, they may benefit 
from an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. Clearly, the Commission would need to 
assess each contested restriction on its merits rather than accepting from the outset that 
all rules forming the basis of a licensing scheme are compatible with EU law. It is also to be 
remembered that Article 165 TFEU cannot be used as the basis for granting an exemption. 
The reasoning to be employed is to be found only in Article 101(3) TFEU.  
 
                                                 
106  UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, 2010 Edition.  
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In the White Paper on Sport, the Commission acknowledged the ‘usefulness of robust 
licensing systems for professional clubs at European and national levels as a tool for 
promoting good governance in sport’.107 The European Parliament’s Belet Report stressed 
the importance of European club licensing in terms of establishing a level playing field in 
Europe given that clubs now compete on a supranational level through participation in the 
Champions League.108 The Independent European Sport Review also favoured its use 
although stressed the importance of diligent enforcement.109   
 
In the future, European football may decide to strengthen cost control further by 
introducing a salary cap. The idea of a football salary cap was mooted in Bosman. In the 
context of discussing alternatives to the disputed international transfer system for players, 
Advocate General Lenz remarked, ‘it would be possible to determine by a collective wage 
agreement specified limits for the salaries to be paid to the players by the clubs’.110 
Further, in Brentjens the Court found that collective labour agreements can escape the 
reach of competition law if the social partners, negotiating in the context of a social 
dialogue committee, demonstrate that the agreement improves the employment and labour 
conditions of those covered by the agreement.111 As is discussed in chapter 4, a social 
dialogue committee for professional football was established in 2008. A hard cap imposes a 
fixed amount on the spending of all clubs whilst a soft cap links spending to a percentage of 
revenue. As a salary cap restricts the ability of a club to freely recruit players, the 
prohibitions contained in EU competition law may be engaged. A cap is inherently collusive 
and may simply be employed in order to allow clubs to maximise revenues and control 
player wages and influence. However, a strong case might be made for a salary cap to be 
considered inherent in ensuring the economic viability of teams competing in the league, 
preserving competitive balance between clubs and encouraging the development of young 
talent. Consequently, following Meca-Medina, a cap might be removed from the scope of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU if the measure does not go beyond what is necessary for the 
attainment of these objectives.  
 
In this regard, a hard cap, whilst imposing a much greater restriction on commercial 
freedom than a soft cap, is more likely to find favour in EU competition law. This is because 
a soft cap may be insufficient to correct competitive imbalance as it disproportionately 
affects the ability of small clubs to improve their position. This is because larger clubs 
would continue to be able to spend more on salaries thus aggravating income disparities 
between clubs. This contrasts with a hard cap which imposes a flat ceiling on the spending 
of all clubs thus creates a more level playing field assuming that all teams spend the 
maximum permissible amount. Non-financial variables such as the quality of training 
regimes are therefore afforded greater prominence. Consequently, whilst a hard cap is 
arguably pro-competitive, a soft cap, although less restrictive on undertakings, may create 
structural imbalance within a league. On these grounds, and depending on the economic 
context in which the cap is imposed, a hard cap is more likely to be considered inherent in 
ensuring the economic viability of teams competing in the league, preserving competitive 
balance between clubs and encouraging the development of young talent. Thus a hard cap 
may escape definition as a restriction under Article 101(1) TFEU. Alternatively, a salary cap 
                                                 
107  White Paper on Sport, p.17. 
108  European Parliament (2007), Resolution of the European Parliament on the Future of Professional Football in 
Europe, A6-0036/2007, 29 March. (The Belet Report). 
109  Arnaut, JL., (2006), Independent European Sport Review, p.73. Accessed at 
http://www.independentfootballreview.com/doc/Full_Report_EN.pdf. 
110  Bosman, opinion of Advocate General Lenz.   
111  Joined Cases C-115/97, C-116/97 and C-117/97 Brentjens Handelsorderneming BV v. Stichting 
Bedreifjspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen [1999] ECR I-6025.  
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may satisfy the exemption criteria contained in Article 101(3) TFEU although the grounds 
for making such a determination lie in the wording of 101(3) and not Article 165 TFEU.   
 
Article 165 TFEU may have more bearing on a possible free movement challenge to the 
imposition of a salary cap. A cap would restrict a player’s right of free movement if the 
acquiring club could not recruit new labour due to the cap requirement. Under these 
circumstances a cap may be challenged under Article 45 TFEU. As a non-discriminatory 
restriction the body imposing the cap would seek to justify the restriction with reference to 
the need to ensure the financial viability of the clubs, the need to maintain competitive 
balance and the need to train young players. In this respect, the body imposing the cap 
would cite the reference to ‘fairness’ contained in Article 165 TFEU. As in Bernard, the Court 
of Justice is unlikely to base its judgment on the Article 165 although it may cite it in order 
to corroborate its view that sport contains a specific nature worthy of protection.     
3.7. Rules regulating players’ agents  
The current FIFA Players’ Agent Regulations provide that clubs and players can only call 
upon the services of agents who are licensed by national associations. The prohibition on 
the use of unlicensed agents does not apply if the agent acting on behalf of a player is a 
parent, a sibling or the spouse of the player in question or if the agent acting on behalf of 
the player or club is legally authorised to practise as a lawyer in compliance with the rules 
in force in his/her country of domicile. The licensing system, and other potentially 
restrictive requirements imposed on agents, have the potential to engage some aspects of 
the TFEU, particularly those relating to competition law and freedom to provide services. A 
competition law challenge to the FIFA regulations has been heard, and rejected, by the 
Court of First Instance (CFI) and the Court of Justice.112 In particular, the CFI found that 
the license system did not result in competition being eliminated, as the system resulted in 
a qualitative selection process, rather than a quantitative restriction on access to that 
occupation. This was necessary in order to raise professional standards for the occupation 
of a players’ agent, particularly as players’ careers were short and they needed protection. 
According to the Court, the rule making authority of FIFA was justified as there was a near 
total absence of national rules regulating agents and there was no collective organisation 
for players’ agents which could be consulted. Therefore, the Piau judgment further 
strengthens the proposition that Article 165 TFEU adds no further protection to the rule 
making authority of governing bodies in the field of agent regulation than that already 
acknowledged by the Court.  
 
However, the flaws in the current system of regulation are now recognised by FIFA 
themselves. It has recently acknowledged that only 25% to 30% of football transfers are 
carried out by licensed agents.113 At the FIFA Congress in 2009, the member associations 
of FIFA therefore voted for ‘an in-depth reform of the players’ agents system’.114 A 
working group of the FIFA committee for club football has been established to report on the 
adoption of a new set of regulations. The working group is composed of representatives 
from the world players union FIFPro, club representatives and the FIFA legal department. 
Once adopted the new regulations will supersede those of 2008. At the time of writing the 
new system has not been made public although the European Parliament has expressed 
concern that abolishing the existing FIFA licence system for players’ agents without setting 
up a robust alternative system would not be the appropriate way to tackle the problems 
                                                 
112  Case T-193/02, Laurent Piau v Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-209. Hereafter 
referred to as Piau, CFI. 
113  FIFA Media Release (2009), FIFA Acts to Protect Core Values, 15/07/09. 
114  FIFA Media Release (2009), Protect the Game, Protect the Players, Strengthen Glob Football Governance, 
03/06/09. 
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surrounding agents in football. In this regard the Parliament called for an EU initiative 
concerning the activities of players’ agents.115 
 
The prospect of EU action in this area was first mooted in the White Paper on Sport in 
which the Commission committed itself to ‘carry out an impact assessment to provide a 
clear overview of the activities of players' agents in the EU and an evaluation of whether 
action at EU level is necessary, which will also analyse the different possible options’.116 The 
study was carried out by a consortium of European research institutes and was published in 
late 2009.117 The study favours a form of self-regulation for agents. It argues that the rules 
adopted by sports federations will best reflect the specificities of each sport within their 
own respective jurisdictions. In this connection the study favours the use of an 
examination-based licensing system for each sport. However, the study argues that in 
framing and implementing these regulations, the sports federations must be supported by 
public authorities, particularly the EU. The study indicates that the EU’s support should be 
supporting and co-ordinating in nature, for example taking the form of facilitating dialogue 
at European level. Consequently, the study does not favour the enactment of specific laws 
at the EU level. It argues that as only five Member States have enacted specific laws 
regulating the activities of agents and as these laws do not give rise to obvious restrictions 
in terms of service provision and establishment, a case for the harmonisation of national 
laws cannot be made. The study does, however, acknowledge that the lack of evidence of 
problems with the current pattern of agent regulation may simply reflect the ease by which 
agents can circumvent regulation.  
 
The discussion concerning whether EU regulation is desirable was addressed by some of the 
stakeholders participating in the consultation exercise organised within the framework of 
this study. As explained below in chapter 5, there is no request for direct EU regulation, but 
for the facilitation and coordination of debate and dialogue among stakeholders. Article 165 
TFEU can facilitate this type of EU action in this field, although it is also possible to address 
the regulation of agents within the framework of the social dialogue or, should legislation 
become desirable, internal market competences such as Article 114 TFEU. 
3.8. Measures regulating betting 
Sports organisations have in many Member States come to rely heavily on betting as a 
source of income. In some states, this has traditionally been subject to state monopolies or 
concessions that have increasingly come under pressure from ECJ judgments on the 
freedom of movement and establishment of betting operators. The freedom of movement 
and establishment for gambling services, including sports gambling can threaten these 
arrangements. Gambling is a service like any other economic activity, and as such is 
governed by a conventional free movement analysis.118 Restrictions such as the state 
concessions which some Member States maintain can be justified either on grounds found 
in the Treaty or objective justifications recognised by the ECJ.119 Generally, sporting 
grounds are not invoked in an effort to justify such arrangements. Instead, claims are more 
often made as to the morality of betting, risks of fraud and crime, and other issues placing 
gambling services at the fringe of legality and thus susceptible to intense regulation and 
even state monopolisation. Where the financial dependence of sport on the proceeds of 
                                                 
115  European Parliament Resolution on Players’ Agents in Sport, B7-0343/2010, 11/06/10. 
116  White Paper on Sport, action point 41. 
117  KEA, CDES & EOSE (2009), Study on Sports Agents in the European Union, a study commissioned by the 
European Commission (Directorate-General for Education and Culture).  
118  For an example with references to the wide body of gambling case law, see Case C-203/08 Sporting 
Exchange Ltd v Minister of Justice (hereafter Betfair), judgment of 3. June 2010, not yet reported, 
paragraphs 22-30. 
119  Betfair, paragraph 26. 
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gambling services has been cited in an effort to justify restrictive or anticompetitive 
arrangements, the Court has noted that redistribution even for such noble purposes cannot 
objectively justify a practice that would otherwise be contrary to EU law.120 It seems 
unlikely that Article 165 TFEU will contribute more than a footnote to the long line of 
orthodox case law on the relationship between sports bodies and the legal regulation of 
betting in Member States. Whilst the power to promote the moral integrity of sportspersons 
could be read as an opaque reference to corruption in sport, it is not easy to see how the 
‘incentive measures’ that stop short of the harmonisation prohibited by Article 165(4) TFEU 
could have a significant impact on the regulation of sports betting. However, in this context 
the reference to the moral integrity of sportspersons could enhance claims that other legal 
bases should be used to this effect. For example, it might be argued that the functioning of 
the internal market in gambling services requires some harmonisation. Such harmonising 
measures could conceivably be based on Article 114 TFEU. In this context, further, if not 
decisive, reference could be made to the moral integrity of sportspersons considered in 
Article 165(2) TFEU. Although corruption is in itself one of the fields in which the EU may 
always issue criminal law rules under Article 82(1) TFEU, where a harmonising measure is 
adopted, it could then be further argued that any civil measures must be accompanied by 
criminal sanctions which could be justified on the basis of Article 83(2) TFEU wherever civil 
measures are enacted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. Thus, even though Article 165 TFEU 
itself provides only for limited forms of action, its rhetoric could be employed to support the 
use of other EU competences towards ends that are not permitted by reference to Article 
165 alone. 
3.9. Rules restricting club ownership 
The English National Investment Company (ENIC) objected to UEFA’s club ownership 
rules.121 The contested rules related to club ownership conditions placed on clubs entering 
UEFA competitions. If two or more clubs are under the common control of a single entity 
only one is entitled to be entered into a UEFA club competition. The rule is designed to 
protect the uncertainty of the results and ensure the public has a positive perception as to 
the integrity of the UEFA competitions with a view to ensure their proper functioning.122 
Public confidence in a sporting competition could be undermined if the public were to 
suspect that on-the-pitch competition between two clubs with similar ownership structures 
was contrived.    
 
ENIC lodged a complaint to the Commission on the grounds that it had been materially 
affected by this rule as two of its clubs, AEK Athens and Slavia Prague had qualified for the 
UEFA Cup and that according to UEFA’s rule, only one team could participate in the 
competition.123 The immediate impact on the affected clubs is clear but in a wider context 
the rule places a restriction on clubs attracting new investment and it restricts the ability of 
undertakings to supply that investment. The impact on small to medium sized clubs is such 
that attempts to improve their relative positions vis-à-vis larger clubs through the 
                                                 
120  See recently, Case C-258/08 Ladbrokes v Stichting de Nationale Sporttotalisator, judgment of 3. June 2010, 
not yet reported, paragraph 8, where the redistributive function was noted in argument but ignored by the 
Court, whose justifications did not include this argument- for good reason, having consistently rejected this 
since Case C-275/92 HM Customs and Excise v Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039 paragraph 60 and Zenatti Case 
C-67/98 [1999] ECR I- 7289 paragraph 36. 
121  Case COMP/37 806: ENIC/UEFA, hereafter referred to as ENIC. See Commission Press Release IP/02/942, 
27. June 2002, ‘Commission closes investigation into UEFA rule on multiple ownership of football clubs’. 
122  The arguments as to the impact of the rule on the integrity of sporting competition are comprehensively 
discussed in a Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) judgment, CAS 98/200, AEK Athens and Slavia Prague / 
UEFA, 20 Aug 1999, hereafter referred to as CAS 98/200.  
123  According to UEFA criteria the club cleared to participate in the competition was Slavia Prague although in 
the event both teams participated in the 1998/99 season as a result of an interim order issued by the CAS in 
July 1998. 
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attraction of investment, and ultimately players, could be frustrated and this could have a 
negative impact on competitive balance in football. These considerations were sufficient, 
according to ENIC, for Article 81 EC (now 101 TFEU) to be engaged and breached. 
Furthermore, ENIC complained that the object of the contested rule was in fact to distort 
competition and that UEFA was motivated by a desire to maintain its monopoly control over 
the European football market, including the lucrative broadcasting rights. The imposition of 
the rule therefore amounted to a breach of Article 82 EC (now 102 TFEU). In order to 
counter a potential exemption finding, ENIC alleged that the assumption that multi-
ownership increases the risk of match fixing or creates such a perception was not 
demonstrated by any evidence and that even if that were the case, less restrictive means 
of achieving that objective existed.124 
 
The grounds for the rejection of ENIC’s complaint are found in the contextual reasoning 
supplied in paragraph 97 of Wouters.125 The Commission found that UEFA’s rule is a 
decision taken by an association of undertakings and as such is theoretically caught within 
the scope of Article 81 EC (now 101 TFEU). However, the object of the contested rule was 
not to distort competition and that the possible effect on clubs and potential investors was 
inherent to the very existence of credible pan European football competitions. Furthermore, 
the measure did not go beyond what was necessary to ensure the legitimate aim of 
protecting the uncertainty of the results and maintaining the integrity of the competition. 
As such, the rule was incapable of being defined as a restriction and consequently it fell 
outside the scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). The decision 
in ENIC therefore strengthens the proposition that Article 165 TFEU cannot be relied on to 
offer any greater protection for integrity related rules than already exists. 
3.10. Rules excluding non-nationals from sporting competitions  
It is common practice in some sports for non-nationals to be excluded from individual 
sporting competitions. In the White Paper on Sport, the Commission committed itself to 
launch a study to analyse this issue.126 The general principle of equality that is one of the 
fundamental principles of EU law is often difficult to reconcile with these sporting practices. 
It also runs counter to the principle of ‘openness’ contained in Article 165 TFEU. The 
principle of equality requires that similar situations shall not be treated differently unless 
such differentiation is objectively justified. This fundamental principle of equal treatment 
finds specific expression in the prohibitions on any discrimination on grounds of nationality 
laid down in other Treaty provisions such as Article 45 TFEU. The potential for these 
provisions to be applied in such a way as to prohibit such discrimination raises concerns 
amongst some Member States and sports organisations who fear for the purity of national 
competitions. For example, for cultural reasons it has been suggested that the conferment 
of ‘national champion’ titles should be reserved for nationals of the Member State within 
which the competition takes place. There is also concern at the prospect of some athletes 
being able to take part in the national championships of more than one country. It should 
also be observed that eligibility rules for international competitions and championships that 
are based on the representation of states (legal nationality), logically are a (co)determining 
factor for the nationality of sportspersons in competitions at the national level that are 
qualifiers for these international competitions. 
 
                                                 
124  ENIC para 15.  
125  ENIC para 31. 
126  In the White Paper on Sport the Commission committed itself to study the situation concerning ‘the equal 
treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions’. Contract award notice 2010/S 31-043484. 
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At the time of writing the extent of the discriminatory practices in individual sporting 
competitions is unknown although it appears that practice varies. For example, the 
discriminatory measures may involve access to sports, the conditions relating to the actual 
practice of sports, the determination of national records, or the award of medals or titles. It 
is also true that the participation of non-nationals in the national championships of sports 
with direct elimination, such as tennis or fencing, may exert a more significant impact on 
the outcome of the competition than in other sports. At this stage it is therefore difficult to 
draw general conclusions. 
 
However, the normal rules governing discriminatory practices will apply. Therefore, the 
rules in question will be grouped into the following categories: first rules which are inherent 
in the organisation of the sport and necessary to pursue the objectives outlined and which 
therefore do not constitute a restriction of EU law; second, those rules which are directly 
discriminatory and must be justified on the grounds of public policy, public security and 
public health, third, those rules which are indirectly discriminatory or non-discriminatory 
but which are capable of justification as long as they remain proportionate; and finally 
those rules which are discriminatory and cannot be justified and must therefore be 
dismissed. This standard assessment remains unaffected by the provisions of Article 165 
TFEU both in terms of a ‘fairness’ defence to the rules and an ‘openness’ challenge to them.    
 
In addition, the reference to ‘fairness and openness in sporting competitions’ contained 
within Article 165 TFEU may add further impetus to efforts to remove nationality 
discrimination in amateur sport. In this respect, one needs to consider the application of 
the social advantage principle which requires EU migrant workers to enjoy the same social 
and tax advantages as national workers. The principle of equal treatment in respect of 
social advantages stems from Article 7(2) of Council Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 
1968 on freedom of movement for workers and family members within the Community. As 
the White Paper on Sport acknowledges, the Court’s case law has extended the right to 
equal treatment in the granting of social advantages to students and non-active persons 
who are lawfully resident in the host Member State. The Court has recognised the right of 
citizens of the Union who are lawfully resident in the territory of the host Member State to 
avail themselves of Article 18 TFEU (non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality) when 
they are in a situation which is identical to that of nationals.   
3.11. The rights of third-country nationals 
In Kolpak, Simutenkov and Kahveci, the ECJ examined the level of protection non-
discrimination provisions contained within association agreements concluded between the 
EU and non-EU states affords individuals of those states.127 The Court has consistently held 
that non-EU sportsmen and women covered by such agreements should not be 
discriminated against in terms of working conditions, remuneration or dismissal when they 
are legally employed in the territory of the Member State. For example, Simutenkov was a 
Russian footballer legally employed in Spain but classified as a non-EU player. His request 
to have his status changed to that of an EU national was rejected on the grounds that the 
rules of the Spanish Football Federation precluded the issuance of such licences to non-
EU/EEA nationals. As only three non-EU players could participate in Primera División 
matches in the 2000/01 season, Mr Simutenkov was liable to suffer a detriment as a result 
of his non-EU status. A reference to the ECJ was made and the Court found that the 
relevant provision of the EU / Russia Agreement offered Russian sportspersons protection 
                                                 
127  Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund v Kolpak [2003] ECR I-4135. Case C-265/03 Simutenkov [2005] 
ECR I-2579. Case C-152/08 Real Sociedad de Fútbol SAD, Nihat Kahveci v Consejo Superior de Deportes, 
Real Federación Española de Fútbol. 
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from discrimination in terms of working conditions, remuneration or dismissal when legally 
employed in the territory of the EU. The Court’s rulings only protect persons who are 
already engaged in the labour market.  They do not alter entry requirements for non-
nationals as these are still set by the Member States. Similarly, the rulings do not confer a 
right of free movement between the Member States to third country nationals. The 
prohibition on discriminatory working conditions only relates to circumstances in which the 
non-national is already legally employed within the member state. As entry requirements 
for non-nationals still reside with Member States, the reference to ‘openness’ contained in 
Article 165 TFEU cannot be interpreted to extend non-national free movement rights 
further than those already permitted by the Court. 
3.12. Rules on national territorial tying 
The Bosman judgment effectively established a two tier European sports market. On the 
one hand the judgment liberalised the European player market by granting professional 
sportspersons enhanced rights of free movement. However, the judgment did not grant 
similar rights to the clubs as service providers. Therefore, whilst the players operate in a 
single European market, the clubs are tied to national markets. The reference to ‘openness’ 
in European competitions contained within Article 165 TFEU may therefore be cited in 
support of liberalising not only the player market, but also the product market in which the 
clubs operate.  
 
In the Mouscron case, the Commission rejected a challenge to UEFA’s ‘home and away’ rule 
on the grounds that it breached Article 82 EC (now 102 TFEU).128 In the press release 
accompanying the unpublished decision, the Commission found that the rule constituted a 
sporting rule that did not fall within the scope of Articles 81 and 82 EC (now 101 and 102 
TFEU).129 Commenting on the case in the White Paper on Sport, the Commission stated 
that the ‘the organisation of football on a national territorial basis was not called into 
question by Community law’ as the rule was indispensable for the organisation of national 
and international competitions in view of ensuring equality of chances between clubs and 
that it did not go beyond what was necessary.130 The notion of purely sporting rules was 
challenged by the Court in Meca-Medina. However, this judgment now introduces the 
possibility of articulating this as a rule ‘inherent’ in the organisation and proper functioning 
of sport although the Court has as yet to accept that the organisation of sport along 
national lines is an objective that ought legitimately to trump all other foundational policy 
aims of EU law. 
 
The Mouscron decision concerned the temporary relocation of a club into another member 
state. In other instances, clubs have sought to relocate permanently to another member 
state but continue to play in the league of the home state. In these circumstances it may 
be doubted that rules preventing this amount to a rule inherent in the maintenance of 
nationally rooted sporting competition. This is because the club would continue to play in 
the same league. Nevertheless, the impact on the football league of the host country would 
need to be considered as would the impact on the clubs supporters who would face an 
international journey to attend ‘home’ matches.  
 
 
                                                 
128  Commission Decision of 09/12/99, Case 36851, C.U. de Lille/UEFA (Mouscron), unpublished Decision.  
129  Commission Press Release IP/99/965, 9. December 99, ‘Limits to application of Treaty competition rules to 
sport: Commission gives clear signal’. 
130  European Commission (2007), The EU and Sport: background and Context, White Paper on Sport, SEC(2007) 
935, 11/07/07, p.71. 
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It is also possible that some large clubs in smaller markets may want to permanently 
relocate into a league in another larger national association whilst remaining based in the 
home state. For example a Dutch club may be interested in playing in the German 
Bundesliga. Liberalisation of the player market has diminished the sporting strength of 
some of the leading teams from the smaller markets as their best playing talent migrate to 
larger markets. Permitting the cross border relocation of clubs would clearly undermine the 
national segmentation of the product market on which much of European sport is based but 
it may enhance competitive balance within European football by allowing larger teams from 
smaller markets to compete more effectively with those teams from larger markets. 
However, if maintaining the national segmentation of the product market is to be 
considered a legitimate objective, then transparent and proportionate rules maintaining this 
segmentation could be considered ‘inherent’ in the pursuit of that objective. Alternatively, a 
case could be made for exempting national tying under Article 101(3) TFEU as it 
contributes to the production of the sporting contest whilst allowing consumers to benefit in 
the sense that the club is tied to the locality were most of its supporters (consumers) are 
based.  
 
As potential service providers, clubs could also rely on Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, depending 
on the permanence of the relocation. As with the application of competition law, a rule 
‘inherent’ in the organisation of sport does not constitute a ‘restriction’ to free movement. 
Any restriction131 can be justified by reference to either the Treaty derogations or Court-
created objective justifications so long as it is proportionate.132 Although the territorial 
organisation of sport has yet to be expressly recognised as an objective justification in free 
movement law, at least the Commission is prepared to entertain analogous arguments in 
the field of competition law. However, it is not clear whether Article 165 TFEU should 
gravitate towards such a conclusion. In fact, the references to ‘European sporting issues’133 
and ‘developing the European dimension in sport’134 could well be interpreted in future 
judgments as requiring the elimination of segmentation along national lines in favour of a 
pan-European approach that ignores national borders. This conclusion is also supported by 
the failure to recognise such divisions when considering the structures of sport and the 
alternative focus on volunteering in sport. 
3.13. Rules on selection criteria. 
In Deliège, the referring Belgian court asked the ECJ to consider whether it is contrary to 
Articles 49, 81 and 82 EC (now 56, 101 and 102 TFEU) to require professional or semi-
professional athletes, or those wishing to become so, to be authorized by their federation in 
order to be able to compete in an international competition which does not involve national 
teams against each other.135 The dispute arose as a consequence of a judokas failure to be 
selected for participation in the 1996 Paris International Judo Tournament. Each 
participating national federation could enter a limited number of affiliated athletes 
irrespective of their nationality. Participation in the Paris tournament enabled judokas to 
acquire points which would facilitate qualification for selection to the 1996 Atlanta Olympic 
Games. Ms Deliège asserted that the judokas selected in her place had achieved less 
outstanding results than her own and that her failure to be selected impeded her career.   
 
                                                 
131  As discussed above, whilst conventional analysis requires that objective justifications are applied to non-
discriminatory restrictions, the sports-related case law obscures this point. 
132  Case C-55/94 Gebhard paragraph 37. 
133  Article 165(1) TFEU 
134  Article 165(2) TFEU 
135  Deliège. 
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The ECJ acknowledged that the choice of criteria is based on a large number of 
considerations unconnected with the personal situation of any athlete, such as the nature, 
the organisation and the financing of the sport concerned.136 It continued that ‘it naturally 
falls to the bodies concerned…. to lay down appropriate rules and to make their selections 
in accordance with them’.137 This is because the governing bodies, in this case the Belgian 
Judo Federation, possess ‘the necessary knowledge and experience’ to exercise such 
judgement and that this is the arrangement normally adopted in most sporting 
disciplines’.138  
 
The Court considered that selection rules for high-profile international tournaments did not 
restrict access to the labour market. 139 This enabled the Court to rely on its established 
distinction between restrictions to market access and rules which merely governed activity 
after access. Post-access regulation was not subject to the Article 56 TFEU prohibition on 
restrictions to the freedom to provide services, whilst after Bosman obstacles to market 
access were caught by the EC Treaty free movement provisions. Deliège could therefore be 
explained as an uncontroversial application of the market access/market activity distinction 
between those non-discriminatory ‘obstacles’ that can be justified, and those that do not 
require justification. This conclusion would be beyond dispute if the Court’s judgment had 
ended at paragraph 62. 
 
However, the Court went beyond this. It attempted to explain why rules ‘inherent in the 
conduct of an international high-level sports event’ might not in law constitute restrictions 
of free movement even if they in fact involved some restrictive criteria being adopted.140 
The Court considered it necessary to observe that the selection system was linked to ‘a 
large number of considerations unconnected with the personal situation of any athlete, 
such as the nature, the organisation and the financing of the sport concerned’.141 Since 
such regulation did not constitute a ‘restriction’ or ‘obstacle’, it was simply not within the 
scope of examination. A limit on the number of competitors that could be selected did not 
‘in itself, as long as it derives from a need inherent in the organisation of such a 
competition, restrict the freedom to provide services’.142 The court did not carry out a 
proportionality analysis of the kind that is required for rules that are considered prima facie 
to constitute obstacles. It is clear that should this logic be repeated in any future case 
involving selection criteria, Article 165 TFEU cannot offer additional protection for such 
criteria beyond that already been recognised by the Court.  
3.14. Rules concerning the composition of national teams 
National team sports play a central role in European sport both in terms of its popularity 
with spectators and its commercial significance for governing bodies. The importance of 
protecting national team sports is acknowledged by the ECJ as a legitimate objective. In 
Walrave the Court held that the prohibition on nationality discrimination ‘does not affect the 
composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, the formation of which is a 
question of purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with economic 
activity’.143 Nevertheless, the Court did find that ‘this restriction on the scope of the 
                                                 
136 Deliège paragraph 65.  
137 Deliège paragraph 67. 
138 Deliège paragraph 68. 
139 Deliège paragraph 61. 
140 Deliège paragraph 64. 
141 Deliège paragraph 65 
142 Deliège paragraph 69. 
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provisions in question must however remain limited to its proper objective’.144 In Deliège, 
the Advocate General remarked, ‘the pursuit of a national team's interests constitutes an 
overriding need in the public interest which, by its very nature, is capable of justifying 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services’.145 Consequently proportionate rules 
designed by the sports governing bodies to protect national team sports are unlikely to be 
considered a breach of the TFEU and the entering into force of Article 165 cannot add 
further protection.  
3.15. Rules protecting sports associations from competition 
Rules that endow special powers on sporting bodies and thus protect them from 
competition can fall foul of several Treaty provisions. The abuse of a dominant position 
achieved through a regulatory role can be contrary to Article 102 TFEU. Action by a 
Member State, namely the grant of such a regulatory role to an economic actor, can also be 
contrary to the state’s obligations to refrain from compromising competition in the internal 
market, now under Article 106 TFEU. In the MOTOE case, the ECJ noted that where a 
Member State granted regulatory powers to a sporting body that was also undertaking 
economic activity, that grant might be liable to lead the economic actor to abuse of their 
resulting statutory dominant position.146 As such, the grant of special powers is in these 
circumstances contrary to the Treaty unless the powers are subject to ‘restrictions, 
obligations and review’.147 This is a requirement even if there was no clear evidence that 
the resulting dominant position was in fact abused. As the review of first principles provided 
in the MOTOE judgment demonstrates, it is very difficult to combine economic and 
regulatory functions in such a way as to prevent both actual abuse and the risk of abuse.148   
 
Therefore in the absence of clear guidance on the conditions that must be attached to such 
arrangements, sports governing bodies are best served by separating these functions as 
was indeed required in the F1/FIA settlement.149 Article 165 TFEU is unlikely to have a 
significant impact on the permissibility of arrangements called into question by the MOTOE 
judgment. Whilst the way in which sport is organised in the EU could indeed constitute 
union action aimed at ‘developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness 
and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for 
sports’ and thus authorised under Article 165(2), such efforts may be hampered by the 
restricted means available under Article 165(4). It seems unlikely that rules on sports 
governance, either confirming or denying the legality of MOTOE- type arrangements, could 
constitute anything other than the kind of harmonising measures that are expressly 
prohibited under Article 165(4). Therefore if EU legislation is to provide a way beyond the 
framework outlined in the MOTOE judgment, it will be legislation adopted despite, rather 
than as a result of, the introduction of Article 165 TFEU.  
                                                 
144  Walrave paragraph 9. 
145  Deliège paragraph 84.   
146  Case C-49/07 MOTOE [2008] Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 1. July 2008. 
147  MOTOE Paragraph 52. 
148  See in great detail Miettinen, S., (2008), ‘Policing the boundaries between regulation and commercial 
exploitation: lessons from the MOTOE case’, 3-4 International Sports Law Journal pp. 11-18. 
149  See Notification by FIA/FOA of agreements relating to the FIA Formula One World Championship, 
COMP/36.776. 
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4. THE POLICY DIMENSION OF THE NEW EU 
COMPETENCE ON SPORT  
 
This study has focused so far on a legal analysis of the implications of Article 165 TFEU. 
However, given the limited impact of the new Treaty provisions on the application of EU law 
to sport, the real innovation brought about by Article 165 TFEU is the possibility, for the 
first time, of developing a direct supportive and complementary policy in the field of sport. 
The impact of European law on sport over the last two decades has been an ‘indirect EU 
sports policy’,150 but the lack of legal base in the Treaty prevented any attempt to plan a 
coherent approach to sport that could be based on well defined and thoroughly researched 
action priorities, objectives, policy instruments and budgetary appropriations. In order to 
escape accusations of acting beyond its powers, the EU linked its sports-related funding 
programmes to existing competences in the Treaty, such as education policy. The new 
sports competence contained in Article 165 allows the EU to finance sport directly without 
the need to justify this action with reference to other Treaty competencies. Thus, the entry 
into force of the TFEU opens a range of possibilities to EU institutions including, amongst 
others, funding programmes on social inclusion, health promotion, education and training, 
volunteering, anti-doping, the protection of minors, combating violence and corruption in 
sport, the promotion of good governance in sport and supporting the development of a well 
researched evidence base on current issues in sport. These and other potential action areas 
are considered below. This chapter analyses the main areas of attention in the 
implementation of policy under Article 165 TFEU. The mainstreaming of sport in other EU 
policies was an objective of the European Commission White Paper on Sport,151 and the 
new Article might give impetus to that effort, but as it is explained above Article 165 TFEU 
does not impose an obligation to do so. The analysis of the policy aspects of Article 165 is 
guided and limited by the strategic objectives set up in the wording of the article itself. 
4.1. EU sports policy taking account of ‘its structures based on 
voluntary activity and its social and educational function’ 
Article 165(1) makes an explicit mention of the voluntary structures and the social and 
educational functions of sport. These three elements tend to be linked to grassroots sport. 
However, policies should also consider the contribution of the professional level to the 
social functions of sport, which was acknowledged in the White Paper on Sport.152 The 
promotion of volunteering in sport is seen as a priority mainly for two reasons. First, 
because volunteers form the lifeblood of sport with a level of employment of up to 86% in 
Austria (as opposed to 14% paid staff) or 80% in France.153 Second, volunteering in sport 
is often considered a vehicle to achieve social integration and inclusion through the concept 
of social capital, as pointed out in the report of the group of independent experts 
assembled by the European Commission.154  
 
                                                 
150  Tokarski, W., Steinbach, D., Petry, K., & Jesse, B. (eds.) (2004), Two Players, One Goal, Oxford: Meyer and 
Meyer Sport,. 
151  European Commission (2007) The White Paper on Sport: Frequently Asked Questions. MEMO/07/290, 11 July 
2007, p. 2. 
152  White Paper on Sport, p. 3. 
153  Study on Volunteering in the European Union (2010), Report for DG EAC submitted by GHK, p. 6. Available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/eyv2011/doc/Volunteering%20in%20the%20EU%20Final%20Report.pdf 
154  European Commission (2010) Group of independent experts: Report on EU priorities in the field of sport, p. 
6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/doc/100702_gise_final_report.pdf. 
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Volunteering is mainly a local or national phenomenon and many of the barriers faced by 
volunteers and sports organisations originate also at the local and national level.155 
Moreover, the levels of volunteering in Europe vary greatly among Member States: ‘Whilst 
certain EU Member States have longstanding traditions in volunteering and well developed 
voluntary sectors, in others the voluntary sector is still emerging or poorly developed’.156 
Before taking any decision in this area it is necessary to acquire a detailed knowledge base 
to analyse volunteering across the European Union. A recent study commissioned by the 
European Commission is a good starting point, but further knowledge and research should 
be a priority. Whilst comparative research and exchange of good practices between 
Member States should be a priority, it might also be advisable to compare volunteering 
structures in sport with other sectors.  
 
The study on volunteering identified a worrying trend in the increasing average age of 
volunteers in European sport: it is proving difficult to recruit young volunteers. There is a 
mismatch between the needs of voluntary organisations and the aspirations of the new 
generations of prospective volunteers. Younger volunteers would like to see shorter term 
voluntary activities rather than long-term commitments. The reliance of sports 
organisations on volunteers is also creating a professionalisation of volunteer activities, 
where highly specialised skills are in demand by organisations but the volunteers feel 
overwhelmed by their responsibilities. In order to favour volunteer engagement, it is 
advisable to devise a dual approach. On the one hand, the removal of legal and 
bureaucratic barriers to volunteers and to organisations wishing to develop volunteering 
programmes. The adoption of recommendations after careful study and research could be a 
suggested way of action. On the other hand, a ‘positive policy’ encouraging and rewarding 
volunteering is also advisable. In this respect, active programmes such as the Europe for 
Citizens programme or Youth in Action should be taken into account. Article 165 TFEU 
opens the possibility of creating positive incentives to develop volunteering in sport. These 
could take the form of a specific funding programme (or a priority area within a wider 
sports programme), but also guidelines and recommendations from the Commission, when 
requested by the Council. At the same time, sports non-governmental organisations can 
also create incentives by coordinating their regulations and facilitating, rather than 
hampering, the mobility of volunteers across Member States. Given the difficulties in 
attracting young volunteers, mobility and exchange might be a decisive factor, if one is to 
judge by the success of similar initiatives in fields such as higher education (e.g. Erasmus 
programme). Those volunteers who are already active and move across Europe to work or 
study should not find barriers to continue their engagement in their receiving country. 
Sports organisations should make sure their regulations do not act as barriers, but rather 
to the contrary, they encourage continued volunteering. 
 
The social and educational function of sport is considered a priority because of the inherent 
values that sport can foster, such as responsibility, tolerance, fair play or team spirit. Sport 
can play an important role in education and in that respect the cooperation between the 
sectors of sport and education should be strengthened. Whilst education is a Member State 
competence, Article 165 could contribute to generate synergies and networks between 
governments, schools and sport organisations. On the other hand, sport is often seen as a 
tool for social inclusion. There is however increasing evidence that integration through 
sport cannot be achieved without inclusion and integration in sport.157 Thus, the latter 
                                                 
155  Ibid.  
156  Study on Volunteering in the European Union (2010), p.6. 
157  See for example Mutz, M. and Baur, J., (2009) ‘The role of sports for violence prevention: sport club 
participation and violent behaviour among adolescents’, International Journal of Sport Policy, 1 (3), pp. 305-
321. 
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should be a priority to maximise the former. Provisions should be made to encourage the 
participation of excluded groups in sport, such as women. The entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which also granted legal status to the charter of fundamental rights, provides an 
opportunity to design a policy with incentives for the inclusion in sport of other excluded 
groups such as migrants, elderly people or low-income families. Initiatives that target a 
variety of excluded groups could be prioritised. Similarly, if the inclusive potential of sport 
is to be realised provisions to fight homophobia, xenophobia and gender-based violence in 
sport should be made a priority. In respect of the latter, current provisions on safety in the 
workplace could be revised to include the practice of sport and at the professional level this 
could be included in the agenda of the social dialogue (see below). 
4.2. Protection of the ‘physical and moral integrity’ of 
sportspersons 
The protection of the integrity of sportspersons is the second dimension of the new 
competence mentioned in Article 165. These provisions have been generally interpreted as 
referring to the fight against doping and the protection of young athletes. The issue of 
doping can be approached from several angles and, therefore, using different competences. 
The World Anti-Doping Agency is currently regarded as the leading international 
organisation in combating doping especially in professional sport, yet its resources and 
competences are limited. With the provisions of Article 165 TFEU that also refer to 
cooperation with sport and international organisations EU action could contribute to 
research and to a better understanding of doping in order to complement WADA. In this 
respect, a true added value could lie in facilitating cooperation among national anti-doping 
agencies in EU Member States. Another important aspect is the implication of police 
cooperation structures, which are already set up, in fighting the trafficking of doping 
substances. Having said this, EU institutions also need to be aware that there are open 
debates on the current international anti-doping strategy. First, some experts question its 
efficacy since doping in professional sport does not seem to have decreased. Second, sport 
stakeholders (especially the athletes) feel that the governance of WADA and anti-doping 
regulations need to be improved to be more inclusive. Initiatives of EU institutions in the 
area of doping need to take into account the case law of the ECJ in Meca-Medina as 
reviewed in this study. In particular they need to ensure that all stakeholders are included 
in decision-making and that the anti-doping strategies of sports organisations follow sound 
principles of good governance. Article 165 creates a legal base for the Commission and 
other EU institutions to facilitate exchange of best practices in the governance of anti-
doping. In the White Paper the Commission suggested it was happy to assist in the 
development of good governance guidelines. Within this framework the Commission has 
already organised a conference on licensing systems and also a conference on anti-doping. 
Given the importance of anti-doping regulations, EU institutions are encouraged to include 
anti-doping structures in any action relating to good governance principles in sport. 
 
Whilst doping in professional sport makes headlines, the independent group of experts 
consulted by the Commission suggested that the consumption of performance enhancing 
substances is as big a problem in amateur and non-organised sport. Indeed, the EU 
presidency trio of Spain, Belgium and Hungary confirmed anti-doping as one of its priorities 
explaining that they were interested in studying the situation at the amateur level. EU 
action in the area of doping in professional sport might limit itself to reinforcing the existing 
structures, if these are considered suitable and effective, but Article 165 TFEU opens the 
possibility of EU funding initiatives in relation to amateur and non-organised sport. At 
amateur level, doping could be considered a health issue. Article 165 TFEU precludes any 
harmonisation of legislation in the field of sport, as does the public health provision in 
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Article 168 TFEU. However, the horizontal nature of the requirement to provide a high level 
of health protection may offer opportunities to develop a dual strategy to coordinate sports-
related national provisions based on health, which itself must be taken into account when 
implementing EU policies. EU action could also add value in creating the forum for debate 
and exchange of information, as well as to give the opportunity to national ministers to 
debate coordination of policies. 
 
A concern for the protection of young athletes has increased since the Bosman judgment 
liberalised the European labour market for professional footballers. Recently, attempts to 
re-regulate the players market through the introduction of UEFA’s locally trained player 
initiative has given rise to concerns that such a move encourages the international transfer 
of minors. In the Belet Report on the Future of Professional Football, the European 
Parliament stated that it is ‘convinced that additional arrangements are necessary to ensure 
that the home-grown players initiative does not lead to child trafficking, with some clubs 
giving contracts to very young children (below 16 years of age)’ and that ‘young players 
must be given the opportunity for general education and vocational training, in parallel with 
their club and training activities, and that the clubs should ensure that young players from 
third countries return safely home if their career does not take off in Europe.’ In addition, 
the 2010 Madrid European Sports Forum discussed a number of issues related to the use of 
young people in sport including overtraining and exploitation, missed education 
opportunities, the use of doping substances, and sexual abuse and harassment. Linked to 
the debate on the transfer of minors is a concern that larger football clubs are attracting 
young overseas players to their academies and this is undermining the efforts of many 
smaller clubs to invest in the education and training of young talent. This has a 
consequential negative impact on competitive balance in European football.  
 
Article 165 TFEU could be interpreted as an invitation to further strengthen the rules 
governing the international movement of young people, whether at EU level or via the 
enactment of private arrangements. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that placing 
restrictions on the international transfer of minors has the potential to engage the EU’s 
provisions on free movement of workers. However, the EU has long recognised as 
legitimate the need to protect minors in sport and it has itself enacted protective legislation 
via Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the Protection of Young People at Work. 
In addition, the 2000 Nice Declaration on Sport expressed ‘concern about commercial 
transactions targeting minors in sport, including those from third countries, inasmuch as 
they do not comply with existing labour legislation or endanger the health and welfare of 
young sportsmen and –women’.158 Similarly, the European Commission’s 2007 White Paper 
on Sport expressed concerns that whilst the movement of minors in sport across frontiers 
may fall short of the legal definition of trafficking, the exploitation of young players 
continues to be a problem in the EU.159 In particular, the Commission cited reports that an 
international network managed by agents takes very young players to Europe especially 
from Africa and Latin America. Those children who are not selected for competitions are 
then abandoned in that foreign country. This heightens the prospects of them falling into 
positions where they may experience further exploitation. For the sake of balance, it is also 
important to acknowledge that the international transfer of minors can benefit young 
                                                 
158  Declaration 29 to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Presidency Conclusions, (2000), ‘Declaration on the specific 
characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing 
common policies’, Nice European Council Meeting, December 2000.  
159  White Paper on Sport.  
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players, both in terms of their football and general education and also their general social 
development and financial security.160    
 
In the White Paper on Sport the Commission acknowledged that the protection of minors in 
sport would also benefit from more effective regulation of the activities of players' agents, 
better licensing systems for sport clubs, and social dialogue in the sport sector.161 All three 
initiatives receive attention throughout this study. In the White Paper, the Commission also 
committed itself to two initiatives. First, to monitor the implementation of EU legislation, in 
particular the Directive on the Protection of Young People at Work. Second, to encourage 
co-operation between the Member States and sport organisations on the protection of the 
moral and physical integrity of young people through the dissemination of information on 
existing legislation, establishment of minimum standards and exchange of best practices.162 
 
Article 165 strengthens the EU’s ability to achieve the above and provides encouragement 
to the sports organisations to strengthen internal sports regulations designed to protect 
minors. In particular, Article 19 of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of 
Players places restrictions on the international transfer of minors. These restrictions are 
theoretically caught by the prohibitions contained in EU free movement law as an EU minor 
who is considered a ‘worker’ can seek the relevant protections offered by Article 45 TFEU. 
Nevertheless, restrictions can be justified on the basis that they pursue, in a proportionate 
manner, a legitimate objective and as is explained above, the EU considers the protection 
of minors to be one such legitimate objective. Therefore, Article 165 does not adjust the 
proposition that proportionately pursued attempts to protect minors are compatible with EU 
law.163  
 
Additional measures designed to deter the international transfer of minors have been 
suggested. First, a young player could be required to sign his or her first contract with the 
training club. Clearly this would act as an obstacle to a player’s free movement and would 
require justification. Second, the training compensation criteria for young players contained 
in the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players could be increased so as to 
deter clubs from poaching young players and as a way of ensuring training clubs are 
rewarded for their investment in youth development. One such increase was approved by 
FIFA in October 2008. However, in Bosman, the ECJ held that training compensation costs 
should relate to the actual cost incurred by the training club.164 If adopted and challenged, 
both of these measures would be tested against the orthodox requirements of the 
justificatory regime and proportionality control contained with EU free movement law. As is 
explained in chapter 2, Article 165 TFEU offers no additional constitutional protection for 
such initiatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
160  For a discussion see Anderson, C. (2009), ‘New FIFA Regulations on the Transfer of Minors’, World Sports 
Law Report, 7(11), pp.3-5. 
161  Commission Staff Working Document, ‘The EU and Sport: Background and Context, Accompanying Document 
to the White Paper on Sport’, COM(2007) 391 final, p51. 
162  White Paper on Sport, points 42 & 43. 
163  For Court of Arbitration for Sport jurisprudence see CAS 2005/A 955 Càdiz C.F., SAD v FIFA and Asociación 
Paraguaya de Fútbol, CAS 2005/A/956 Carlos Javier Acuña Caballero v FIFA and Asociación Paraguaya de 
Fútbol and CAS 2008/A/1485 Midtjylland v FIFA. 
164  Case C415/93 Bosman, para. 109. 
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4.3. Promoting ‘cooperation between bodies responsible for sports’ 
The EU has long promoted dialogue with the sports movement. From 1991 to 2003 the 
European Sports Forum brought together representatives of the sports movement. In 1997 
the Heads of State and Government released the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport which 
called ‘on the bodies of the European Union to listen to sports associations when important 
questions affecting sport are at issue’.165 In addition, in the 1999 Helsinki Report the 
Commission proposed a ‘new approach’ to sport which involved ‘preserving the traditional 
values of sport, while at the same time assimilating a changing economic and legal 
environment….[t]his overall vision assumes greater consultation between the various 
protagonists (sport movement, Member States and European Community) at each level. It 
should lead to the clarification, at each level, of the legal framework for sports 
operators’.166 The discussion on sport at the 2004 intergovernmental conference led the 
Commission to reconsider its dialogue with the sports movement and in 2005 it launched a 
consultation process, ‘The EU & Sport: matching expectations’.167 A second consultation 
took place in June 2006 entitled ‘The Role of Sport in Europe’. These, and other high level 
meetings held between the Commission and the European sport federations throughout 
2004, 2005 and 2006, informed the Commission’s White Paper package released in July 
2007.168 In the White Paper the Commission recognises that the commercialisation of sport 
has attracted new stakeholders and this ‘is posing new questions as regards governance, 
democracy and representation of interest within the sport movement’.169 The Commission 
suggests that it can play a role in helping to develop a common set of principles for good 
governance in sport such as transparency, democracy, accountability and representation of 
stakeholders.170 In the White Paper, the Commission argues that governance issues in sport 
should fall within a territory of autonomy and that most challenges can be addressed 
through self-regulation which must however be ‘respectful of good governance 
principles’.171  
 
The EU has identified social dialogue as a means of promoting better governance in sport. 
The constitutional basis for social dialogue is located within Articles 153-155 TFEU. Social 
dialogue refers to discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions involving 
organisations representing the two sides of industry, namely employers and workers (the 
social partners). Nearly 40 social committees exist in the EU covering a wide range of 
sectors. These committees have concluded a large number of autonomous agreements at 
the European level which the social partners implement themselves, or which are 
transformed into binding legislation. The White Paper argued that social dialogue in the 
sports sector could ‘contribute to addressing common concerns of employers and athletes, 
including agreements on employment relations and working conditions in the sector in 
accordance with EC Treaty provisions’.172 The White Paper added that ‘a European social 
dialogue in the sport sector or in its sub-sectors (e.g. football) is an instrument which 
allows social partners to contribute to the shaping of employment relations and working 
conditions in an active and participative way. In this area, such a social dialogue could also 
lead to the establishment of commonly agreed codes of conduct or charters, which could 
                                                 
165  Declaration 29 to the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
166  European Commission (1999) The Helsinki Report on Sport, Report from the European Commission to the 
European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of 
sport within the Community framework. COM (1999) 644 final, 10 December 1999, p.7.  
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address issues related to training, working conditions or the protection of young people’.173 
The content of an agreement could be potentially wide but it must pertain to the 
employment relationship between clubs and players. This could include the status and 
transfer of players, contractual issues, the protection of minors, solidarity payments, the 
international match calendar, doping, image rights, pension funds, and the use of artificial 
turf.174 Social dialogue in the sports sector is underdeveloped with only professional football 
having so far established a formal social dialogue committee (July 2008). The reference to 
promoting co-operation between sports bodies contained in Article 165 TFEU validates the 
Commission’s efforts into promoting social dialogue in sport. Since 2001 the Commission 
has funded a number of projects exploring the viability of social dialogue between 
representatives of clubs and players.175 It is to be recommended that this support 
continues.  
 
Social dialogue is however only one aspect of the structured dialogue and Article 165 
implies that this dialogue can be improved. Questions as to the efficiency of the European 
Sports Forum led to its suspension in 2003. The White Paper on Sport committed the 
Commission to re-launching the Sports Forum and in 2008 a meeting was held in Biarritz, 
France. Given the diversity of the sports movement, questions must remain as to the 
effectiveness of the Sports Forum in its present format. A wide and inclusive membership 
may struggle to stimulate sufficient debate and mutual learning between parties as 
stakeholders may be prone to simply state their position. A more streamlined Sports Forum 
will naturally exclude some stakeholders and provoke resentment amongst them. The 
recent initiative to create working groups within the Forum was to be tested in the 2010 
edition in Madrid, but unfortunately major travel disruption prevented many of the 
participants from attending. Yet, the level and quality of debates in that edition of the 
Forum would suggest that it can be a useful tool for dialogue between sports organisations 
and the Commission. Whilst not abandoning the Sports Forum, the Commission should 
monitor its value, consider its format, and in time form an opinion as to its usefulness.  
 
As a parallel development, the Commission should further develop its thematic dialogue 
with the sports movement over specific issues including the regulation of agents and the 
protection of minors. The structure of this dialogue should not assume that any single 
stakeholder has a monopoly on representation and therefore bilateral dialogue between the 
Commission and individual stakeholders should be discouraged. Thematic structured 
dialogue should not lead to ‘agreements’ such as the so-called Bangermann agreement on 
player quotas in 1991. In this instance, the ECJ reminded the Commission that it does not 
possess the power to authorise practices that are contrary to the Treaty.176 It is also 
important that structured dialogue, either conducted through the Sports Forum, bilaterally 
or thematically, in no way undermines efforts by social partners to conclude agreements 
within the context of social dialogue committees.  
 
Outside the Commission structure, dialogue with the sports movement can take place 
through political initiatives at member state level. Following a recent proposal of the 
Spanish presidency, EU sports ministers are currently discussing the creation of a 
permanent structure for dialogue with the sporting movement. Whilst agreement seems to 
                                                 
173  Ibid section 5.3. 
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have been reached as to the representation of the European institutions, difficulties persist 
in deciding on the representation of sport organisations. In this respect, the same 
recommendation applies that no single stakeholder should be assumed to hold a monopoly 
on the representation of the relevant sport.  
 
Until the entry into force of Article 165 TFEU, member state political cooperation took place 
informally outside the formal Council structure. Individual Presidencies often decided to 
prioritise sport but discussion was restricted to informal meetings of EU Sport Ministers and 
EU Sport directors and to ad hoc expert meetings on priority themes. Article 165 grants the 
Member States a competence to adopt a more formal and coherent approach to sport. 
Ministers discussed EU sport policy for the first time in a formal Council setting in May 
2010. At this meeting Ministers suggested the following areas for possible EU action: (1) 
Social and educational functions of sport, (2) Sport structures, in particular those based on 
voluntary activity, (3) Fairness and openness in sport, including the fight against racism, 
discrimination and violence; (4) Physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and 
sportswomen, especially the fight against doping and the protection of minors and (5) 
Dialogue and close cooperation with the sports movement.177 This focus on a limited 
number of priority themes for Member States should be favoured over a more 
comprehensive programme. Not only does it allow for the development of a coherent rolling 
agenda on the issue, it also realistically manages the high stakeholder expectations that 
have accompanied the Article 165 debate.   
4.4. Cooperation with third countries and international 
organisations 
The European Commission already analysed in its White Paper on Sport the role of sport in 
the Union’s external relations and in sustainable development: ‘As an element of external 
assistance programmes, as an element of dialogue with partner countries and as part of the 
EU's public diplomacy’.178 Article 165 TFEU reinforces that forward looking vision of the 
Commission and proposes active international cooperation in the field of education and 
sport, although the competence for action in this field needs to be found elsewhere in the 
Treaty. EU external action is mostly in the hands of the Member States and therefore the 
EU sport ministers are a key element to the development of this part of Article 165. The 
Commission and sport ministers should cooperate to establish an international dimension to 
the nascent EU sport policy. This could be of significant advantage in relations with partner 
countries and especially having regard to the problems of child migration analysed above. 
One of the strategies of EU immigration policy is to engage with countries of origin to 
reduce the flow of illegal immigrants reaching the Union. It is recommended here to study 
the inclusion of the sports sector in cooperation and development agreements with third 
countries in order to enhance the protection of young sportspersons willing to relocate to 
EU Member States. Similarly, concrete actions in the field of sport could be supported by 
the EU within the framework of development policy. The social functions of sport already 
identified through this study are of even more value in developing countries. Sport in this 
respect is conceived as a policy tool and EU institutions would be advised to cooperate with 
other international institutions and non-governmental organisations with significant 
expertise to introduce sport in its development policy. One of the most significant 
institutional reforms of the TFEU is to reinforce the Union’s external service. The new Union 
service is developing at the time of writing. It is perhaps too early to consider the extent to 
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which the external service could engage in sport-related issues, but it is worth keeping an 
open mind and regularly monitoring the new structures to find appropriate opportunities.  
 
The mention of cooperation with international organisations in Article 165 TFEU has been 
interpreted by some stakeholders as a reference to international sports organisations and 
thus as a reference to the autonomy of sport and the responsibilities of non-governmental 
sport organisations. This seems too broad an interpretation, for one could consider that 
Article 165 refers exclusively to cooperation with states and international organisations in 
the traditional sense, especially when there is explicit reference to the Council of Europe, 
an intergovernmental international organisation. The European Council already indicated in 
the Amsterdam and Nice declarations that EU institutions should consult sport governing 
bodies when implementing EU policies, therefore the Commission and the European 
Parliament can draw on the expertise of sport non-governmental organisations to develop 
the external dimension of EU sport policy. Indeed, an example of the latter can be seen in 
the memorandum of understanding signed between FIFA and the European Commission in 
2006 to make football a force for development in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. 
The co-operation with sports organisations is an advantage, but not a requisite. 
 
Finally, the Article calls for cooperation with the Council of Europe. This is of special interest 
when taken together with provisions elsewhere in the Treaty that give legal personality to 
the Union, hence enabling the EU to sign to International conventions. One of the 
possibilities explicitly endorsed by the new provisions in the Treaty is for the EU to sign the 
Council of Europe conventions related to sport, namely the anti-doping convention and the 
European Convention on Spectator Violence. The former might be useful for extending anti-
doping cooperation beyond the 27 EU Member States, although anti-doping efforts are 
lately channeled by national governments through WADA and UNESCO. The latter could 
certainly be part of the ongoing cooperation between Member States to tackle spectator 
violence. Careful legal and political analysis should be undertaken before such a decision is 
taken. Further to these possibilities, the work of the Council of Europe in sport should be 
valued by EU institutions. Mutual contact and coordination are encouraged in order to avoid 
duplication of efforts. 
4.5. Legislative action under Article 165 
Article 165(4) TFEU enables the adoption of incentive measures, but does not enable the 
harmonisation of laws across Europe. As has been observed above, this limits hard 
legislative instruments to those that are adopted on the basis of other Treaty competences. 
Since Article 165 TFEU seems in this respect analogous to the public health competence on 
which some case law does exist, it appears that the mainstreaming of sporting interests 
during legislative processes could be hindered, rather than enhanced, by Article 165. If the 
analogy with public health case law holds, the Article 165(4) prohibition on harmonisation 
cannot prevent legislation with impacts on sport whilst Article 165(1) appears, unlike some 
other supporting competences such as Article 168(1), not to provide a horizontal clause 
requiring sporting issues to be considered in all ordinary legislative processes. Thus, whilst 
ordinary EU legislation is likely to continue to affect sporting issues and Article 165(4) fails 
to exclude the possibility of using ordinary EU legislative bases to regulate sport, Article 
165(1) enables the funding previously denied to purely sporting EU initiatives but provides 
neither an obvious route towards the development of sports-specific legislation nor a 
constitutional requirement to mainstream sporting issues into the ordinary legislative 
process. 
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5. RESULTS OF CONSULTATION EXERCISE 
 
A consultation effort was designed to complement this study with the views from sport 
governing bodies, sport stakeholders, other sport non-governmental organisations, public 
authorities, private companies, academics and practitioners with a knowledge and 
experience in the field. The call for contributions was sent to a wide range of experts and 
interested organisations, which were asked to elaborate on their preferences and priorities 
for the implementation of Article 165 TFEU. A total of 37 contributions from 52 
organisations were received.179 
 
Table 1: Distribution of responses by organisations 
ORGANISATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS 
Stakeholders’ associations 8 
National Olympic Committees 6 
Academics, practitioners and think tanks 7 
National Governments of EU Member States 4 
International sport non-governmental organisations  5 
International Sport Federations 3 
National Sport Federations 2 
IOC (‘Olympic and sports movement’) 2 
International Organisations 1 
TOTAL 37 
 
In the contributions received there is a clear representation of the Olympic movement, with 
8 submissions from Olympic committees at both national and international level and 4 sport 
federations also at national and international levels. Thus, the governing bodies of sport 
presented altogether a majority of 12 responses to the consultation. Sport stakeholders 
(athletes, supporters, clubs and leagues) have submitted a total of 6 contributions, being 
the second most represented group in the consultation. The contribution of 4 EU Member 
State governments is also noteworthy. The present section of the study summarises the 
most relevant points of the responses received, highlighting those where a very general 
consensus has been found, but the distribution of responses, which clearly overrepresented 
the positions of the Olympic movement and the governing bodies of sport, needs to be 
taken into account when considering the results. Whilst a good degree of consensus can be 
found in some of the priorities, it is also clear that sport organisations can also present 
contradictory demands in specific key issues that would be difficult to reconcile with the 
development of EU sport policy under Article 165 TFEU. 
 
                                                 
179  Some of the contributions received were joint efforts by several organisations, especially the views of the 
‘Olympic and Sports movement’ that were presented as endorsed by 18 Olympic Committees and Sports 
federations. 
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Thematically, the contributions received could be categorised into three broad groups. First, 
there is a set of responses proposing very specific priorities for the implementation of 
policies and programmes under Article 165 TFEU. These are concrete suggestions with 
articulated policy objectives and suggested courses of action. Second, there are those 
submissions focusing on interpretation of concepts that could shape not only the policy on 
sport, but also other EU competences when dealing with sport matters. These contributions 
highlight the impact of EU law and policies on sport and they request a more explicit 
recognition of the autonomy of sport organisations and a better definition of the specificity 
of sport recognised in Article 165 TFEU in order to provide the sporting movement with 
greater legal certainty. Finally, there is a third group of submissions that can be considered 
to address an horizontal level, where stakeholders elaborate on the general characteristics 
that any EU action in the field of sport should have. Each of the three groups is discussed 
now in turn. 
5.1. Priorities for a direct EU sports policy 
Three areas emerge as clear consensus priorities for the development of EU sport policy in 
the consultation. These are: (1) sport health and education, (2) the recognition and 
encouragement of volunteering in sport, and (3) the development of sport activities as a 
tool for social inclusion. EU action addressing these three policy objectives would be 
welcome by the respondent stakeholders. The three priorities feature prominently in almost 
every one of the responses and they are also clearly aligned with the priority areas 
identified by the Commission in the White Paper on Sport,180 the 2009 and 2010 
preparatory actions181 and the public consultation exercise.182 Similar areas, albeit with 
different headings, were discussed in the European Sport Forum 2010 organised in Madrid 
and were positively received by the representatives of the sport organisations.183 It is 
becoming increasingly apparent that these areas emerge as the translation of the general 
principles enshrined in the Treaty into policy objectives where Article 165(1) TFEU calls for 
the Union to contribute to the promotion of sport’s ‘structures based on voluntary activity 
and its social and educational function’. 
 
The majority of contributors have a preference for measures with a clear added value at 
European level. Thus, it is suggested that EU action should focus on research funding, 
facilitating the exchange of best practices, elaborating guidelines and on adopting incentive 
frameworks to encourage civil society, national and sub-national authorities to implement 
similar policies. The latter is especially stressed in the case of volunteering, where sport 
organisations contributing to this consultation feel that they face too many regulatory 
barriers to develop effective volunteering programmes. Some of the most concrete 
contributions in this area propose, for example, a twofold strategy whereby EU policy shall 
aim at encouraging legal and even fiscal incentives to volunteering, together with measures 
to remove obstacles to the free movement and exchange of volunteers within EU Member 
States. One of the most cited examples of the latter is the need to recognise formally the 
skills developed by volunteers as part of the EU Lifelong Learning Programme. 
 
There is also a second group of policy priorities that have been put forward in a majority of 
contributions but do not carry the same degree of consensus that those explained above. 
                                                 
180  See White Paper on Sport (2007), p. 3-7. 
181  European Commission (2009), 2009 annual work programme on grants and contracts for the preparatory 
action in the field of sport and for the special annual events, COM (2009) 1685, 16 March 2009. 
182  European Commission (2010), Strategic choices for the implementation of a new EU competence in the field 
of sport, EU-wide consultation report, available online at  
 http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/doc/a/100726_online_consultation_report.pdf. 
183  See the Forum’s report published by the European Commission, available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/doc/b1/sport_forum_madrid_report_11_05_10.pdf. 
The Lisbon Treaty and EU Sports Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 57 
These relate to the integrity of sport and can be summarised as comprising (1) the fight 
against doping, (2) the relationship between gambling and sport, and (3) the welfare of 
under-age sportspersons. These priorities feature especially in the contributions submitted 
by sport governing bodies and sport organisations engaged in the promotion of grassroots 
sport and sport for all (e.g. the International Sport and Culture Association). Again, these 
three main headings are also well aligned with the priorities identified by the European 
Commission184 and could also be considered as concrete policy translations of Article 165 
(2) TFEU when it refers to ‘promoting sporting fairness’ and ‘protecting the physical and 
moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen’.  
 
In relation to anti-doping, EU action would be welcome in two very concrete fields: research 
funding due to the World Anti-Doping Organisation’s limited resources, and facilitating the 
development of a collaborative network of National Anti Doping Organisations within the EU 
Member States. In this area it is particularly stressed that EU action is only desired as a 
valued complement to the ongoing policies of Member States, WADA, UNESCO and sport 
organisations. The contribution of the Ministry of Education and Culture of Finland, for 
example, calls to concentrate on areas ‘that are currently lacking of European-level 
cooperation’. The relationship between gambling and sport raises two different concerns. 
First, the influence of betting practices in sport. Sport governing bodies would welcome any 
EU actions that could facilitate police cooperation in the fight against illegal betting and 
corruption in sport. Second, sport organisations express their worries that a possible 
liberalisation of the betting and gambling market could have negative consequences on the 
funding of sport, especially at grassroots level, in countries where most sport programmes 
rely on funding from lotteries. Finally, in relation to the welfare of under-age sportspersons, 
the collaboration of EU institutions is requested to help in the fight against the trafficking of 
underage athletes and in the exchange of good practices to ensure the training of minors is 
correctly designed and monitored.   
5.2. Priorities regarding the impact of EU law and policies on sport  
The second category of priorities expressed in the consultation refers to the impact of EU 
legal provisions on sport, rather than to the active development of a future EU sports 
policy. This clearly originates in the reference within Article 165(1) to the need to take 
‘account of the specific nature of sport’, crystallising the references to the specificity of 
sport that can be found in the Amsterdam and Nice declarations on sport and many rulings 
of the ECJ. The contributions in this category do not present however the same degree of 
consensus and, therefore, it is necessary to point out from the outset that initiatives under 
these priorities would be more difficult to adopt with the general support of sport 
stakeholders.  
 
The main action requested in the contributions is the elaboration of a definition for the 
specificity of sport which is as complete as possible. This is a top priority for the ‘Olympic 
and sports movement’ and sport governing bodies, with support of Member States’ 
governments. The governments of Finland, Germany and the Netherlands specifically call 
for the drafting of guidelines in the application of competition policy and other EU legal 
provisions to sport. It is argued by sports organisations that guidelines on the application of 
EU law to sport would increase legal certainty, hence reinforcing their autonomy and 
efficiency in the governance and regulation of sport. In view of the analysis in this study, it 
is however difficult to see how the guidelines that are demanded would add greater legal 
certainty for sports organisations when the case law of the ECJ is fairly consistent.  
 
                                                 
184 See notes 180-183 above. 
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The notion of the specificity of sport is widely supported by EU Member States, as reflected 
in the conclusions of the European Council in 1997, 2000 and 2008, but the specific request 
to draft extensive guidelines is however less concrete. The European Parliament, on the 
other hand, has already clearly requested the Commission to elaborate guidelines on the 
application of competition policy to sport.185 As explained elsewhere in this study, the 
European Commission argued in the White Paper on Sport that the ECJ’s case law prevents 
the adoption of guidelines because the application of competition policy provisions has to 
be analysed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The division within EU institutions in this respect mirrors the disagreements among sport 
organisations. Whilst governing bodies and Olympic committees support the development 
of the specificity of sport, other stakeholders such as athletes, clubs and leagues clearly 
warn in their contributions that the definition of sport’s specificity ought to respect workers 
and stakeholders’ rights, especially as the TFEU renders legal the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Thus, the elaboration of guidelines does not represent a top priority (if at all) for 
these actors. Those who support, in principle, the specific nature of sport as a concept 
worth exploring (e.g. the European Professional Football Leagues or the European Clubs 
Association) request to be consulted and involved in any exercise whose result might be an 
interpretation of the application of EU law to sport. 
5.3. Priorities for the horizontal development of EU sport policy 
The third group of priorities presented in the contributions refers to the way in which 
stakeholders would like to see EU actions implemented, rather than to the content of the 
policies. This is seen as extremely important in a large majority of the contributions and, 
therefore, it merits attention when considering the course of action in the development of 
policies under Article 165 TFEU. First, there is a unanimous call for EU institutions to focus 
on added value and European-level initiatives. This reiterates the provisions contained in 
Articles 6 and 165 TFEU on the level of competence, but the insistence in this respect 
suggests there might be an anxiety among the respondents that EU institutions risk 
usurping the competences of Member States and, especially, the competences of sport 
organisations. A strict application of the principle of subsidiarity, with due respect for the 
autonomy of sport, is requested by sport governing bodies and Member State governments 
alike. 
 
Second, there is also an agreement to support the need for a knowledge-based policy. This 
has two main implications. On the one hand, there is a common call for the EU to fund 
research in sport-related areas, with the economic impact of sport and anti-doping being 
the most commonly cited. On the other hand, sport stakeholders such as athletes and 
supporters demand to be consulted as a source of expertise in the elaboration of policy 
initiatives within their remit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
185  European Parliament (2007), Resolution of the European Parliament on the Future of Professional Football in 
Europe, A6-0036/2007, 29 March. (The Belet Report), paragraph 55. 
The Lisbon Treaty and EU Sports Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 59 
Third, in terms of policy instruments, direct regulation by the EU is not a priority of the 
contributors to the consultation. In the area of sports agents requests were made in the 
past for the European Commission to study the possibility of regulation,186 but stakeholders 
now prefer EU institutions to facilitate debate and information exchange to adopt sound 
self-regulation. Thus, EU institutions are requested mostly to facilitate the development of 
networks, the comparison of policies across EU Member States and the cooperation among 
sport organisations and public authorities. There is, however, one area where an important 
number of stakeholders request active promotion by the European Commission: social 
dialogue in the sports sector. Contributions by athletes and by football supporters call on 
the EU institutions to support and promote social dialogue as a tool for good governance. 
 
Finally, there is a common call for EU institutions to keep sports organisations involved in 
the development and implementation of EU sport policy. In this respect Article 165(2) TFEU 
calls for the EU to promote ‘cooperation between bodies responsible for sport’ and Article 
165(3) demands that ‘the Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third 
countries and the competent international organisations in the field of education and sport’. 
None of these provisions expressly call to cooperate with sport organisations in the 
development of EU sports policy, but the Amsterdam and Nice Declarations pointed out the 
Member States’ willingness to keep them involved. The Commission and the European 
Parliament have so far proved able to engage with the sports sector. Stakeholders have 
expressed their unanimous desire to collaborate with EU institutions, putting their expertise 
at their disposal. Moreover, there is also a request made especially by Olympic committees 
and governing bodies that the implementation of any future EU programme in the field of 
sport prioritises the participation of local sports organisations. 
 
                                                 
186  White Paper on Sport, p. 16. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Article 165 does not contain a horizontal clause. There are no provisions in the Article that 
require sporting issues to be taken into account when making policies in other areas, but 
there are also no provisions in 165 which prohibit the EU from doing so. Regardless of the 
value attached to Article 165 by the Court and the Commission, its existence is unlikely to 
alter their existing approach to sport. A review of existing EU sports law cases reveals that 
Article 165 TFEU will add little further protection for contested sports rules beyond that 
already provided by the Court and the Commission. In this regard, the review reveals that 
the Court and the Commission have already been highly receptive to the notion that sport 
contains a ‘specific nature’. Therefore, the often requested production of guidelines on the 
application of free movement and competition law to the sports sector may not greatly 
assist the search for legal certainty. The Commission’s White Paper on Sport more than 
adequately explains the legal framework applicable to sport. Furthermore, as the ECJ 
decided in Meca-Medina, contextual analysis and the requirements of proportionality control 
in EU law necessitate a case-by-case analysis of disputes involving sport. This renders any 
informal guidelines subject to challenge.187 
 
Rather than passively relying on the reference to the ‘specific nature of sport’ contained in 
Article 165 to seek to limit the influence of EU law in sport, the sports movement should 
take a lead in defining this contested term. This definition should be built into the relevant 
sports regulations following an open and transparent method of operation facilitated by the 
governing bodies but involving affected stakeholders. The definition should be thoroughly 
reasoned and backed with robust data. The EU has a strong role to play in facilitating this 
dialogue, sharing best practice and ensuring that sporting autonomy is conditioned on the 
implementation of good governance in sport. Efforts at encouraging social dialogue in sport 
should be maintained and moves towards a structured dialogue should not undermine 
these efforts. Thematic dialogue with the sports movement should be encouraged. 
 
Article 165 resolves any legal uncertainty concerning the competence of the EU to directly 
fund sports related programmes. It is now clear that the EU has the competence to directly 
carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States in 
the field of sport and this competence grants the EU a potentially wide field of action. 
However, the choice of priority themes should be directly linked to the themes contained in 
Article 165 and before supporting priority areas, the EU should demonstarte the European 
dimension in sport and establish the added value of EU action. A focus on a narrow range 
of priority areas is to be favoured over a broad approach so that the added value of EU 
action can be demonstrated. In this connection, the consultation exercise reveals that 
stakeholders favour action in the areas of health enhancing physical education, 
volunteering and social inclusion. A majority of respondents also identified the fight against 
doping, the relationship between gambling and sport and, the welfare of under-age 
sportspersons. In addition to these areas, there is a need to focus on evidence based policy 
making and in this connection the EU should fund research and encourage stakeholders to 
justify their positions with solid data and research.  
 
On the face of it, Article 165(4) also appears to be unequivocal concerning the prohibition 
on harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. This statement might 
encourage claims that the laws and regulations of the Member States cannot be 
harmonised in so far as this would affect sporting practices. However, an examination of 
                                                 
187  Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991. 
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past prohibitions of harmonisation and their treatment by the ECJ suggests that 
harmonising measures can be taken despite this type of prohibition so long as the 
harmonising measures are nominally based on another Treaty competence. Despite 
similarly worded prohibitions of harmonisation in the fields of social policy, education, 
vocational training, culture, and public health, the EU has in practice achieved convergence 
in legislation through other legal bases.  
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ANNEX 
TEXT OF STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION LETTER 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the European Union (EU) 
acquired a specific competence in the field of sport for the first time. Sport is mentioned in 
Article 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as one of the 
policy fields where the Union has competence to support, coordinate or supplement the 
actions of its Member States. 
The 'new' Article 165 TFEU sets out the details of sports policy. It states that the "Union shall 
contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific 
nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational 
function". More specifically, the objectives of sports policy are described as being to: (1) 
promote fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies 
responsible for sports and (2) protect the physical and moral integrity of sports 
practitioners, especially the youngest among them. 
The existence of a new specific competence is expected to open up new possibilities for EU 
action in the field of sport. However, EU competences over the Single Market have already had 
a considerable impact on sport and these will remain as important as ever. The European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) has over the years developed extensive and important case law that has had 
major implications on the world of sport. At the same time, the EU has already had an influence 
on sport in exercising its 'soft law' powers in closely related areas such as education, health and 
social inclusion via its respective funding programmes. 
Moreover, the lack of a specific legal competence has not prevented the European Commission 
from building up the beginnings of an EU sports policy, as outlined in the 2007 White Paper 
on Sport and its associated "Baron de Coubertin Action Plan", which began to be 
implemented in 2008. The Commission has also directly financed certain sporting projects 
under the sports 'preparatory action' in 2009. 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has spurred the European Commission to begin 
work on a proposal for fully-fledged EU sports programme and on a policy 
communication on sport and the Lisbon Treaty. These two items are expected to be sent to 
the European Parliament for consideration in the second half of 2010. 
In light of the above, the European Parliament's Committee on Culture and 
Education (CULT) has commissioned the T.M.C. Asser Institute to undertake a study 
whose objective is to provide a panorama of the possibilities of EU Sports Policy at a time 
when these are being reviewed after the approval of the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, it 
should assess, from a legal point of view, the potential of the new TFEU to enable the EU to attain 
the objectives of greater fairness and openess in sporting competitions and greater protection of the 
moral and physical integrity of sports practitioners whilst taking account of the specific nature of sport. 
The study should make use of existing literature and ECJ case-law on the topics concerned, 
notably recent jurisprudence dating from after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It 
should also take into account the relevant (European Parliament (EP) resolutions 
(notably on the White Paper on Sport and on the Future of Professional Football in 
Europe). Given the forward-looking nature of the brief, the literature and legal review 
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should only constitute a starting point to be complemented by direct information-
gathering and discussion with parties interested in the development of EU Sports Policy, 
including sports associations or clubs at both professional and amateur level, pan-
European umbrella organizations representing sport, national and EU civil servants, the 
private sector and academics. 
If you wish to participate in the stakeholders consultation for this study, we would 
appreciate it if you could send us your views on what the EU’s priorities for sport should be, 
by 1 July 2010 at the latest. 
You may address your answers, preferably by e-mail, to R.Siekmann@asser.nl 
and/or by fax to: +31 (0)70 3420359 or +31 (0)70 3420346 to the T.M.C. Asser 
Institute to the attention of Dr Robert Siekmann. 
 I look forward to receiving your reply. 
Yours faithfully, 
Dr Robert C.R. Siekmann 
Director 
ASSER international Sports Law Centre 
R.J. Schimmelpennincklaan 20-22 
2517 JN The Hague 
P.O. Box 30461 
2500 GL The Hague 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31 (0)70 - 3420342/345/300 
Fax: +31 (0)70 – 3420359/346 
E-mail: R.Siekmann@asser.nl 
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STAKEHOLDERS WHO WERE INVITED TO RESPOND TO CONSULTATION 
For the purpose of direct information gathering and discussion with parties interested in 
the development of an EU Sports Policy, the following categories of organisations and 
persons were consulted: 
International “umbrella” organisations: 
 International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
 European Olympic Committee (EOC EU Office) 
 Association of National Olympic Committees (ACNO) 
 General Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF) 
 Association of IOC Recognized International Sports Federations (ARISF) 
 Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) 
 Association of International Olympic Winter Sports Federations (AIOWF) 
 International Assembly of National Organisations of Sport (IANOS) 
 International Paralympic Committee (IPC) 
International and European sports federations per sport (Olympic sports): Aquatics (FINA / 
LEN); Canoeing/Kajak (ICF / ECA); Cycling (UCI / UEC); Gymnastics (FIG/UEG); Volleybal 
(FIVB and CEV); Equestrian (FEI and EEF); Wrestling (FILA and CELA); Archery (FITA and 
EMAU); Athletics (IAAF and EAA); Badminton (BWF and EBU); Basketball (FIBA and FIBA 
Europe); Boxing (AIBA and EBA); Fencing (FIE and EFC); Field hockey (FIH and EHF); 
Football (FIFA and UEFA); Handball (IHF and EHF); Judo (IJF and EJU); Modern Pentathlon 
(UIPM); Rowing (FISA); Sailing (ISAF and EUROSAF); Shooting (ISSF and ESC); Table 
Tennis (ITF and ETTU); Triathlon (ITU and ETU); Weightlifting (IWF and EWF); Skating 
(ISU); Ice Hockey (IIHF); Curling (WCF and ECF)); Skiing (FIS and ESF); Biathlon (IBU); 
Luge (FIL); Bobsleigh (FIBT). 
National sports federations and associations per sport in the 27 EU Member States. 
Clubs (international/European “umbrella” organisations), for example: European 
Association of Sports Employers (EASE); EPFL (football/leagues); ECA (football/clubs); 
ULEB (basketball); AIGCP and IPCT (professional cycling). 
N.B. Clubs from the most important sports per country at amateur and professional level 
were consulted for the purpose of the study (for example, France: football, rugby; 
Germany: football, ice hockey, handball, basketball; Italy: football, basketball; 
Netherlands: football, field hockey; Austria: football; Spain: football; United Kingdom: 
football, rugby, cricket). 
International and European players’ unions: EURO-MEI UNI (sports employees); 
European Elite Athletes Association; UBE (basketball); FIFPro Europe (football); CPA 
(professional cycling).  
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EU civil servants: Sport Unit, Directorate-General for Education and Culture, European 
Commission; Directorate-General Education and Culture (Social Dialogue in sport). 
National civil servants: sports directors in the 27 EU Member States (Government 
Departments and/or Agencies in each Member State with primary powers in the area of 
sport). 
ASSER International Sports Law Centre’s standing network of sports law experts in the 27 
EU Member States (academics and practitioners): 
 Austria: Ingo Braun, Baier Böhm Law Firm, Vienna  
 Belgium: Dr An Vermeersch, European Institute, Law Faculty, Gent   
 Bulgaria: Boris Kolev, international sports lawyer and co-chairman of the NGO Bulgarian 
Legal Society, Sofia 
 Cyprus: Dr Gregory Ioannidis, Law School, University of Buckingham, United Kingdom, 
and Christodoulos G. Vassiliades & Co Law Firm, Nicosia  
 Czech Republic: Katerina Radostova, Erad Legal Law Firm, and Law Faculty, Charles 
University, Prague  
 Denmark: Prof. Dr. Soren Sandfeld Jakobson, Law Department, Copenhagen Business 
School, Frederiksberg 
 Estonia: Katarina Pijetlovic, Faculty of Law, International University Audentes, Tallinn 
 Finland: Tauno Palotie, Veikko Palotie & Co Law Firm, Helsinki 
 France: Jean-Michel Marmayou, Paul Cézanne University, Marseille  
 Germany: Prof.Dr Peter Heermann, Law Faculty, University of Bayreuth   
 Greece: Prof. Dr. Panagiotopoulos, advocate and Law Faculties, Athens and Peloponnese 
Universities  
 Hungary: Dr Andras Nemes, Faculty of Physical Education and Sport Sciences, 
Semmelweis University, and President of SPORTJUS, Budapest  
 Ireland: Laura Donnellan, School of Law, University of Limerick   
 Italy: Lucio Colantuoni, Law School Genoa and Milan University   
 Latvia: Sarmis Spilbergs, Klavins & Slaidins LAWIN Law Firm, Riga  
 Lithuania: Jaunius Gumbis, Lidelka, Petrauskas, Valiunas & Partners Law Firm, Vilnius  
 Luxembourg: Jean-Luc Schauss, Loyens & Loeff Law Firm, Luxembourg  
 Malta: Dr Anthony Galea, Deguara Farrugia Law Firm, Sliema  
 Netherlands: Prof. Dr Stefaan van den Bogaert, Law Faculty, University of Leiden   
 Poland: Prof. Dr. Andrzej J. Szwarc, Department of Law and Administration. Adam 
Mickiewicz University, Poznan  
 Portugal:  Alexandre Mestre, A.M. Pereira, Saragga Leal, Oliveira Martins Law Firm, 
Lisbon  
 Romania: Prof. Dr Alexandru Virgil Voicu, Faculty of Physical Education and Sport, 
“Babes-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca  
 Slovakia: Jozef Corba, Faculty of Law, Pavel Jozef Safarik University, Kosice  
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 Slovenia: Prof. Dr Peter Grilc, Law Faculty, University of Ljubljana   
 Spain: 
 Juan de Dios Crespo Pérez, Ruiz Huerta & Crespo Sports Lawyers, Valencia   
 Sweden: Erik Ullberg, Wistrand Law Firm, Goteborg  
 United Kingdom: Prof. Dr Stephen Weatherill, Somerville College, University of Oxford  
SportAccord, The International Association of Sportslaw Practitioners and Executives 
(ASPE), the International Association of Sports Law (I.A.S.L.) and the International Sports 
Lawyers Association (I.S.L.A.) were also consulted for the purpose of the Study. 
The European Sports Law and Policy Initiative (ESLPI), founded in 2009 by Professors 
Michele Colucci and Frank Hendrickx, University of Leuven, was consulted for the purpose 
of the Study. 
Following an invitation extended by the European Commission at the Consultation 
Conference “The EU & Sport: Matching Expectations” in 2006, a large number of 
organisations asked to meet with the Commission on issues related with the White Paper 
on Sport in 2006 and 2007. These consultations included meetings and contacts with the 
organisations and bodies listed in the White Paper on Sport (Annex III: consultations with 
stakeholders). These organisations and bodies again were consulted within the framework 
of this Study. 
 Additionally, organisations connected with specific topics of the Study were consulted: 
sports betting: European Lotteries (state-licensed lotteries and toto companies) and EGBA 
(private, commercial lotteries); media rights: European Broadcasting Union (EBU); doping: 
Association of National Anti-Doping Organisations (ANADO) and national anti-doping 
organisations in the 27 EU Member States (NADO’s); European players’ agents: EFAA 
(football) and AEBA (basketball). 
Organisations connected with other, additional topics dealt with in the White Paper on 
Sport, were consulted: physical education and public health:  Fédération Internationale de 
Médecine Sportive (FIMS); active citizenship: association Sport et Citoyenneté/Sport and 
Citizenship; social inclusion and integration: European Association for Sport and Social 
Integration (E.A.S.I.); racism and violence in sport: Football against Racism in Europe 
Network (FARE); sponsorship: The European Sponsorship Association (ESA); supporters: 
 Supporters Direct. 
An internet-based, on-line consultation targeting all interested organisations and individuals 
wias open during an 6-week period as from the beginning of the Study’s operation. 
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STAKEHOLDERS WHO RESPONDED TO CONSULTATION 
Intergovernmental organisations 
Council of Europe  
National Governments of EU Member States 
Ministry of Education and Culture, Finland (Sports Division) 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, Germany (EU and international sports affairs) 
Government of Malta 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, The Netherlands 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, United Kingdom 
International sports federations 
FIFA 
UEFA 
International Olympic Committees 
EOC EU Office 
National Olympic Committees 
NOC of Denmark 
CNOSF (France) 
COSL (NOC of Luxembourg) 
Maltese Olympic Committee 
Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF) 
Olympic Committee of Slovenia 
National sports associations 
British Swimming and Amateur Swimming Association 
International employers (leagues, clubs)  organisations 
EPFL (Association of European Professional Football Leagues)  
ECA (Europa Club Association (football) 
International employees (players) organisations 
EU Athletes (European Elite Athletes Association) 
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The PGAs of Europe (The Professional Golfers’ Associations of Europe)  
National employees (players) organisations 
FNV Sport (The Netherlands) 
Professional Players Federation (PPF) (football)  
International agents associations 
Association of European Basketball Agents (AEBA) 
Other international non-governmental organisations 
SportAccord  
ENGSO (European Non-Governmental Sports Organisation) 
ISCA Europe (International Sport and Culture Association) 
Sport and Citizenship / Sport et Citoyenneté  
EAS-Network (The European Athlete as Student Network) 
Sport Rights Owner’s Coalition (SROC) 
Supporters Direct Europe  
European Women and Sport (EWS)  
Academics 
Hellenic Center of Research on Sports Law (H.C.R.S.L.) (Athens, Greece) 
Oxford University (United Kingdom) 
Practitioners (law firms) 
Christodoulos G. Vassiliades & Co. LLC (Nicosia, Cyprus) 
Ulys (Btussels, Belgium and Paris, France) 
F&D Avvocati (Milan, Italy) 
Lidelka, Petrauskas, Valiunas ir partneriai LAWIN (Vilnius, Lithuania) 
Loyens & Loeff (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) 
CMS Derks Star Busmann (Utrecht, The Netherlands) 
Ruiz Huerta & Crespo Sports Lawyers (Valencia, Spain) 
 
 

 

